22 Jun Slip and Fall in Township Parking Lot

The trial of Lowe v. Sidney (Town of), 2020 BCSC 335, involved a Plaintiff who slipped on a small patch of black ice and fell while walking in a public parking lot operated by the Town of Sidney (the “town”).

The town had a policy in place with respect to snow and ice removal, comprised of written policies, unwritten policies, and policy decisions.  Responses under the policy were triggered by complaints from the public, weather reports, observations of staff, and notifications from the RCMP.

Early on the morning in question, the RCMP contacted the town, stating that “roads are getting icy”.  This notification triggered the town’s policy. In accordance with the policy, the identified area was salted. The crew spent an additional 1.5 hours driving throughout area.  No ice was seen on any of the roads.  Intermittent salting was performed as a precautionary measure.

Workers drove by the lot where the Plaintiff later fell, but did not drive into the lot to inspect it.  When the public works employees began their normal morning shifts, they were instructed to inspect and distribute salt to priority areas.

Later that morning, the Plaintiff walked across a town parking lot.  She did not notice any ice or snow on the lot’s surface. When she returned to her car, she took roughly the same path she had taken an hour earlier.  She did not notice anything on the surface of the lot that appeared slippery.  As she approached a low point near a drain, she suddenly slipped and fell. As she was getting up, she noticed a small patch of black ice where her feet had been. The Plaintiff injured her shoulder, hurt her lower back, and broke her wrist in the fall.

Public authorities do not owe a duty of care if their actions were based upon a policy decision, unless the decision was made in bad faith or was so irrational as not to be a proper exercise of discretion.  However, public authorities can be liable for operational decisions if the required elements of liability are proven.

As a general rule, decisions concerning budgetary allotments for departments are classified as policy decisions, because they are an attempt by the public authority to strike a balance between efficiency and thrift.

The town argued that it was exempt from owing a duty of care to the Plaintiff because its actions were in keeping with the policy, which was put in place bona fide and in good faith based on, among other things, the availability of manpower, equipment, and budgetary constraints.

The Plaintiff submitted that the classification of the lot as a low priority area was not a bona fide policy because the lot was along the town’s priority routes and could easily have been inspected with little to no extra effort.

The judge was satisfied on the evidence that the policy was dictated by financial, economic, and budgetary constraints. It was a proper exercise of discretion.  Included in the policy was the determination that its public parking lots were areas of low priority for snow and ice inspection and control, in the absence of a particular complaint or extreme weather event.  This was a resource allocation decision and, thus, an unassailable policy decision.

The judge also found the policy decision to be reasonable. To require those involved in the inspection of priority areas to divert their attention to and inspect areas considered low priority was illogical and inconsistent with reasonable resource allocation and prudent policy-making. The judge held that the policy was bona fide.

The judge found that the town had a complete defence to this action because the decisions it made during the morning in question regarding ice control were policy decisions, not operational decisions.

The judge noted that even if the decisions made had been operational in nature, such that a duty of care was owed to the Plaintiff, the town’s response on that morning was reasonable and met the standard of care expected of it in the circumstances.

Since the Plaintiff failed to prove that any breach of duty on the part of the town was a proximate cause of her injuries, her action was dismissed.