IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Date: 20111021

Docket: M091103

Registry:
Vancouver

Between:

Ting Ting Hsu

Plaintiff

And:

Jesse M. Williams

and Cougar Creek
Contracting Ltd.

Defendants

Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice
Savage

Reasons for Judgment

I.                
Introduction

[1]            
This action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 16,
2007, near the intersection of Granville Street and 41^st Avenue, in
Vancouver, B.C. (the “Accident”).

[2]            
The plaintiff, Tiffany Hsu (“Hsu”), was travelling southbound on
Granville Street, returning home in a late model Mercedes.  She stopped as
another vehicle obstructed passage in her lane.  The defendant, Jesse Williams
(“Williams”), was driving a Chevrolet Colorado Crew Cab.  Williams braked when
he saw that the vehicle ahead had stopped, but was unable to stop and struck
the Mercedes from behind.

[3]            
Hsu says that her current condition, sacroiliac joint dysfunction with
chronic axial myofascial disorder was caused by the Accident.  The defendant
says there are significant causation issues.  Hsu had been involved in an
earlier accident in 1998 (the “1998 MVA”).  She had some ongoing complaints that
arose from the earlier accident.  After the Accident she also suffered a fall.

[4]            
Hsu claims damages totalling about $100,000.  Although the defendant
admits liability he says that damages are most probably in the range of
$7,000-$10,000, although he advances alternative positions based on whether the
burden of proof regarding causation has been met.

II.              
Issues

[5]            
As I have noted, liability is admitted.

[6]            
The defendant says that Hsu bears the burden of showing that, but for
the negligence of the defendant, she would not have suffered the symptoms of
which she complains.

[7]            
The defendant says that Hsu has not met that burden in light of the
quality of the evidence, and the fact that Hsu had pre-existing complaints, an
underlying condition, and injuries caused by an intervening event.

III.            
Discussion

A.             
The Accident

[8]            
Williams was travelling down Granville at about 50 kilometres per hour. 
He saw that the vehicle ahead had stopped and applied his brakes.  He was
unable to stop.  Williams estimated his speed at between 5 and 15 kilometres
per hour at the time of the collision.  Williams described the impact as
“light” although he agreed that he had no idea of what the impact was like on
the vehicle he struck.  Williams confirmed that the impact pushed the stopped
Mercedes forward.  He estimated that the Mercedes moved forward a foot or two.

[9]            
Hsu was driving the Mercedes, which was stopped at the time of impact. 
The vehicle belonged to her sister, Ms. Chanel Hsu, who was in the
passenger seat.  Both were wearing their seat belts.  Hsu said her head went
forward and then backwards, striking the head rest with sufficient force to
break the hair clip on her head.  Although both vehicles were damaged, the cost
to repair both vehicles was less than $2,000.  Ms. Chanel Hsu was not
injured.  Hsu exchanged her particulars with Williams.

[10]        
Ms. Chanel Hsu drove the vehicle home.  She described the impact as
a hard collision.  Ms. Chanel Hsu said that Hsu’s head hit the steering
wheel after the impact and then hit the head rest, breaking her hair clip.  The
hair clip was a big hair clip.  At the time, Hsu complained to her sister of a
severe headache.

B.             
The Injuries and Course of Treatment

[11]        
Hsu testified that she felt pain at the scene of the Accident.  She had
a headache.  She was in shock and dizzy and therefore did not drive.  Hsu said
that she did not sleep well that night or thereafter.  She testified that her
neck and head were in pain, and she had soreness in her neck, to her left
shoulder and lower back.  She took Tylenol for pain but her pain increased over
the next week.

[12]        
As the pain did not improve, about a week after the Accident Hsu went to
see her family doctor at Parker Place in Richmond.  She did not go earlier because
she was trying to avoid missing work.  Her doctor referred her for massage
therapy and prescribed medication.  She saw a second doctor who recommended
acupuncture and sleeping pills.  The acupuncture gave temporary relief but the
pain came back the next day.  Hsu took sleeping pills because she could not
sleep with the discomfort.  She continued to work but found she could not stand
too long, she felt miserable, and could not walk as before.  Hsu had many pairs
of high-heeled shoes but found she could no longer wear them without suffering pain.

[13]        
Hsu also went to a chiropractor.  Those treatments gave temporary relief
but the pain returned.  At the end of 2007 or beginning of 2008 Hsu returned to
Taiwan.  She remained in Taiwan, except for occasional visits, until February
of 2011.  In Taiwan she sought treatment, and had some traditional Chinese
medicine therapies.  Those also gave some relief but her condition did not
improve.  Hsu returned to Canada on a couple of occasions to see her mother. 
She resumed the treatment she had earlier received here but then returned to
Taiwan.

[14]        
In April 2010 Hsu saw Dr. John Armstrong.  Dr. Armstrong is a
medical physician and also holds a Ph.D. in Neurology and Neurosurgery.  He was
formerly an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Medicine at the University of
Toronto and Staff Neurologist at the Hospital for Sick Children and Montreal
Children’s Hospital.

[15]        
Dr. Armstrong worked extensively in a multidisciplinary pain
assessment and management program at the Thorson Pain Rehabilitation Clinic in
North Vancouver and the Metro Rehab Centre in Vancouver and Surrey.  He has
dealt extensively with the assessment and management of chronic pain arising
from various disorders including chronic myofascial disorders and chronic
neuropathic pain disorders and fibromyalgia syndrome.  Dr. Armstrong
interviewed Hsu with the aid of a translator and gave his opinion on various
matters including her diagnosis and prognosis, and matters of causation
regarding Hsu’s ongoing complaints.

[16]        
Dr. Armstrong opined that Hsu suffers from chronic axial (neck and
back) myofascial disorder.  He noted that this was likely a pre-existing soft
tissue condition in the left shoulder and back following the 1998 MVA that was
aggravated by the Accident.  Complications include myofascial tensions
headaches; myofascial tension myalgia in the neck, shoulders and upper back;
and myofascial disorder of the muscles and ligaments of the lumbar area, and
the hip and pelvic girdles.  Hsu also demonstrated malalignment syndrome secondary
to sacroiliac joint dysfunction, enthesopathy at the left PSIS and the GTs,
adjustment disorder, and chronic pain.  Dr. Armstrong noted that Hsu had
suffered chronic pain before the Accident.

[17]        
Dr. Armstrong also opined that Hsu demonstrated “cognitive
distortions”.  Hsu was not disingenuous but probably did this unconsciously. 
For example, Hsu strongly focussed on pain, and reported that her level of pain
was “completely intrusive” when performing personal care activities such as
bathing, grooming, dressing and toileting, and interfered “even more” in other
activities of daily living, such as shopping, housework, employment and
socializing.  Dr. Armstrong found that Hsu’s reports in this regard were
cognitive distortions.  Hsu carried on full- time employment for most of the
time following her accident and travelled relatively frequently.  In Dr. Armstrong’s
opinion, the level of disability Hsu reported was inconsistent with her level
of performance, particularly with regard to her employment activity and
travel.

[18]        
Hsu fell down some stairs in 2009.  Dr. Armstrong did not have access
to complete clinical records.  In the absence of such access, he said “it [was]
difficult to ascertain what role, if any, her fall downstairs in 2009 had
played in determining her clinical presentation of sacroiliac joint dysfunction
when I saw her”.  Nevertheless, because of her unrestricted life style prior to
the Accident, he opined that is was unlikely that she had sacroiliac joint
dysfunction prior to the Accident.  While the fall down the stairs in 2009 was
likely to be at least an aggravating factor, the longevity of her symptoms
prior to the fall indicated that the Accident was the more likely cause of her
injury.

[19]        
After Hsu visited Dr. Armstrong, she participated in a variety of
procedures in Taiwan.  Those procedures are set out below in my discussion of
special damages.  The procedures were minimally described in the documents
before the court and not fully described in the evidence of Hsu.

IV.           
Causation

[20]        
The plaintiff argues that significant impairment can follow minor
collisions with little property damage, citing the decision of
Thackeray J., as he then was, in Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78
B.C.L.R. (2d) 236 (S.C.) at paras. 4 and 5.  However, regardless of the
severity of the collision, it is not sufficient to point to an antecedent event
and assert cause.  It is necessary for the court to conclude, on a balance of
probabilities, that the accident is the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

[21]        
Dr. Armstrong opined that the forces applied in the Accident were
“likely to have been sufficient to overload and injure those soft tissues and
her sacroiliac joints”.  Absent the Accident or some similar trauma, it was his
opinion that she would not have suffered an exacerbation of her pre-existing
axial myofascial disorder, or an injury to her sacroiliac joints, and would not
have developed malalignment syndrome, enthsopathis, Adjustment Disorder, or a
Major Depressive Disorder, and the complications of the pain he described.

[22]        
There is no evidence that Hsu suffered any trauma during this period
other than the Accident, the 1998 MVA and 2009 fall.  Dr. Armstrong
discounted the 1998 MVA and 2009 fall as the cause of the plaintiff’s injury
because of the history of her condition given by Hsu.  Of course, both Ms. Hsu
and Dr. Armstrong were cross-examined on this issue.  I accept, however,
that the court should be exceedingly careful when there is little or no
objective evidence regarding injuries, as noted by the courts in cases such as Maslen
v. Rubenstein, [1993] B.C.J. 1813 (C.A.), 83 B.C.L.R. (2d) 131, Price v.
Kostryba (1982), 70 B.C.L.R. 397 (S.C.) and Butler v. Blaylock, [1981]
B.C.J. No. 31.

[23]        
This case is further complicated by the cognitive distortion suffered by
Hsu.  I accept, however, that this is not intentional, and merely results in an
unconscious exaggeration of the effect that the Accident has had upon her.  I
am not persuaded that these distortions indicate that Hsu has been untruthful
about the circumstances of the accident or the history of her condition.

[24]        
Essentially, Dr. Armstrong opines that Hsu’s injuries were caused
by the accident because of the timing of symptomology.  There are no conflicting
opinions regarding the cause in evidence.  Even where there is no conflict in
the evidence, it is still necessary that a party prove on a balance of
probabilities the cause of the condition for which they are seeking
recompense.  In my opinion, the evidence in this case meets that threshold.  The
symptoms were exhibited after the Accident and before the 2009 fall.  There is
no evidence to support another cause.

[25]        
Notwithstanding Ms. Hsu’s cognitive distortion, I find that, on a
balance of probabilities, but for the Accident, Ms. Hsu would not have suffered
an exacerbation of her pre-existing axial myofascial disorder or an injury to
her sacroiliac joints and the sequella as described by Dr. Armstrong.  The
impact of the collision was sufficient to cause the exacerbation and injury and
did so.  These injuries had the consequential effects described by Dr. Armstrong.

V.             
General Damages

[26]        
This case is somewhat unique in that there is little documentary or
opinion evidence regarding the plaintiff’s condition or complaints in the years
either before or after the Accident.  There are no clinical records before the
court, nor are there hospital records (as the plaintiff was not hospitalized). 
The defendant notes that memories of events or conditions some years before may
be imprecise, and that a participant in an event has an interest in the outcome
of the proceeding, which can alter, consciously or subconsciously, the accuracy
of testimony.

[27]        
This is not to say that there is insufficient evidence before me to
reach a decision.  There is the evidence, of course, of the plaintiff’s sister
and Mr. Zhi Xiong Huang, also known as Alex Wong (“Huang”).  I largely
discount the evidence of Huang.  Huang gave his evidence as an advocate for
Hsu.  He stated that he very much wanted to be her witness and as a result of
his own previous injury considered himself something of an “unlicensed expert”
regarding the effects of such injuries.  Huang perceived his role as assisting
Hsu to prove how she had changed as a result of the accident.  Huang said he
knew Hsu well because he had been intimate with her, although, somewhat oddly,
Hsu said she had a different boyfriend at the time.  Huang was obviously
sympathetic to Hsu.

[28]        
I also have the testimony of Ms. Chanel Hsu.  She is Hsu’s sister
and was her long-time business partner.  Together they operated a boutique,
which they sold following the Accident.  The defendant says that I should
discount Ms. Chanel Hsu’s evidence as she is Hsu’s sister and former business
partner, and her evidence is not consistent with the objective facts and even
with Hsu’s own testimony.

[29]        
There are a number of inconsistencies between the evidence of Ms. Chanel
Hsu and Hsu.  For example, Ms. Chanel Hsu said that the plaintiff hit her
head on the steering wheel before her head was flung back against the headrest
of the vehicle’s diver seat.  Hsu said only that her head went forward and back
and hit the headrest.  Ms. Chanel Hsu said that the plaintiff performed
only light duties with shorter hours in Taiwan when working at her father’s
business, but the plaintiff testified to long hours and light duties.

[30]        
I accept that these are inconsistencies, but I also accept that Ms. Chanel
Hsu saw the immediate impact of the injuries on her sister and business
partner, as they worked together daily.  I do not consider the inconsistencies
between their versions of the events surrounding the Accident as significant. 
Both testified that Hsu’s head was pushed forward and then back against the
headrest, breaking her hair clip.  Whether Hsu’s head actually hit the steering
wheel is something that may have been difficult to detect in the seconds in
which the event unfolded.  Of course, Ms. Chanel Hsu did not observe her
sister’s work in Taiwan over a long period, as she returned to North America.

[31]        
There is no issue that Hsu continued to work after the accident, and has
done so since.  Her major complaint is that doing so causes her significant
discomfort, which she also has when performing ordinary tasks.  She says that the
discomfort prevents her from performing ordinary tasks outside of work, but she
is able to work and has worked and does not claim for loss of income.  In fact,
as opined by Dr. Armstrong, Hsu suffers cognitive dysfunction that leads
her to believe her injuries have a greater impact on her life and livelihood
than they actually do.

[32]        
Hsu has also sought a variety of treatments for her ailments and paid
for the same at her own expense.  With respect to such expenses, a plaintiff is
entitled to recover all reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the injury,
with reasonableness measured in the context of the surrounding circumstances at
the time the expense was incurred: Chamberlain v. Giles, 2008 BCSC 171
at para. 69.

[33]        
Hsu has spent thousands of dollars of her own funds on therapies and
treatments, none of which, in my opinion, have been proven to be required or
helpful in the long term.  Nevertheless, I cannot believe that Hsu would have
gone to the lengths she has, and expended the funds that she has spent to
achieve relief did she not genuinely believe such treatment necessary.

[34]        
Assessing general damages is complicated by the fact that Hsu had
ongoing complaints and was undergoing physiotherapy for the 1998 MVA at the time
of the Accident.  Dr. Armstrong believed that the fall she suffered in
2009 would have also, at least temporarily, aggravated her condition. 
Regarding the effect of her ongoing complaints, Dr. Armstrong found that
she suffered “cognitive distortion” regarding such impacts.  It is clear that
the impact did not prevent Hsu from working.  Likewise, although she asserts
that her ongoing complaints curtailed her other activities very significantly,
in my opinion, that is likely exaggerated as well.

[35]        
The plaintiff cites a number of cases including Charboneau v.
Cunningham, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2128, Brock v. King, 2009 BCSC 1179,
and McCarthy v. Wiebe, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2590 in support of an
award of general damages in the amount of $60,000.

[36]        
The defendant cites Mohammed v. Frey, [2006] B.C.J. No. 317,
Dhillon v. Ashton, 2009 BCSC 1109, and Mohamadi v. Tremblay, 2009
BCSC 898 in support of an award of general damages in the amount of
$7,000-$10,000.  The defendant’s cases assume that the ongoing complaints are unrelated
to the injuries sustained in the Accident, a position I do not accept.

[37]        
In the alternative, the defendant cites cases such as Nicholas v.
Henry, 2006 BCSC 694, Bray v. Gaete, 2004 BCSC 335, and Loik
v. Hannah, 2009 BCSC 1196 in support of an award in the range of
$20,000-$25,000.  Those cases all involve soft tissue injuries that caused pain
that was symptomatic 3-4 years post-accident with a prognosis for the injuries to
never completely resolve.

[38]        
With respect to the plaintiff’s cases, the decision in Brock involved
fewer complications as there was no pre-existing injuring requiring ongoing
treatment at the time of the accident.  There was no aggravating but unrelated
event occurring post-accident.  In that case the evidence of the plaintiff and
her witnesses regarding the accident’s impact on the plaintiff’s activities was
accepted by the court.  There was no suggestion of “cognitive distortion”
regarding the impact of the plaintiff’s condition.

[39]        
In McCarthy the plaintiff sought compensation for two accidents. 
The accidents had a significant impact on the plaintiff’s employment, and she
was awarded some $38,000 in past income loss.  At three years post-accident she
had just returned to full-time employment.  There was no suggestion of any
pre-accident issues or intervening events.

[40]        
In Charboneau the plaintiff was required to take a leave of
absence from her work for nearly a year to allow her injuries to heal.  She
took medications for pain and developed an addiction.  Her progress and course
of treatment were born out by the medical evidence.  In my opinion, the
decision in Charboneau concerns a more severely injured plaintiff.

[41]        
As I see it, the case law supports an award of damages between the
amounts suggested by the plaintiff and the defendant (in its alternative
position).  I find that $30,000 is an appropriate award for general damages in
this case, before considering whether there has been appropriate mitigation.

VI.           
Mitigation

[42]        
In Graham v. Rogers, 2001 BCCA 432 (application for leave to
appeal dismissed, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 467), Rowles J.A.(Huddart J.A.
concurring) said at para. 35:

Mitigation goes to limit recovery
based on an unreasonable failure of the injured party to take reasonable steps
to limit his or her loss.  A plaintiff in a personal injury action has a
positive duty to mitigate but if a defendant’s position is that a plaintiff
could reasonably have avoided some part of the loss, the defendant bears the
onus of proof on that issue. Red Deer College v. Michaels (1975),
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 324 at 331, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 386 at 390, and Asamera Oil Corp.
v. Sea Oil & General Corp. (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633, 89 D.L.R. (3d)
1, provide support for that proposition.  In this case, the appellant argues
that the respondent did not meet the onus of proof by showing or establishing
that the appellant could reasonably have avoided his income or employment
losses.

[43]        
In his very thorough report, Dr. Armstrong gave treatment
recommendations.  Although he applied a caveat, that “my remarks are my
opinions and should not be understood as directives for the provisions of Ms. Hsu’s
care” as that would be “at the discretion of her treating physicians and other
care providers”, his report is the only medical opinion before the court. 
Those recommendations included (1) a focused and carefully supervised
program of rehabilitative exercise aimed at correcting her sacroiliac joint
problem; (2) minimizing passive therapies; (3) supervised stretching
and posture improvement under the guidance of a physiotherapist; (4) a
progressive program of exercise under the supervision of a physiotherapist to
strengthen her core muscles; (5) counselling sessions with a clinical
psychologist familiar with chronic pain management; (6) a progressive walking
program; and (7) time off work to pursue rehabilitation.

[44]        
 The plaintiff has largely not followed these recommendations.  There is
no evidence, for example, that she embarked on a supervised program of
rehabilitative exercise, counselling sessions, or has worked on stretching and
posture improvement under a professional’s guidance.  She did not embark on a
progressive program to strengthen core muscles.  There is no evidence that she
has sought out a clinical psychologist to assist her in chronic pain
management.  Hsu did not take time off work to pursue rehabilitation.  Hsu also
continued with, and seeks compensation for, continuing passive therapies.

[45]        
For example, Hsu claims as special damages acupuncture treatments
covering a period from March 2007 to June 5, 2011 ($1,050); massage
therapy treatments from 2008-2010 ($1,419); massage treatments in Taiwan
($13,150); massage treatments and a one year gym pass paid for in 2010
($1,800); acupressure and acupuncture treatments in 2011 ($670.24); undescribed
“rehabilitation treatments” ($760); and various prescription medications ($194.72).

[46]        
Dr. Armstrong’s report was introduced in evidence by the
plaintiff.  Although Dr. Armstrong says that the opinions are not
directives for future care, and that future care should be at the discretion of
her treating physicians and other care providers, there are no opinions of
those treating physicians or care providers in evidence.  So there is no
evidence that those treatment recommendations should not have been carried
out.

[47]        
The importance of carrying out those recommendations is significant.  Dr. Armstrong
opined that the longer chronic sacroiliac joint dysfunction persists, the less
favourable is the chance for significant improvement.  Although his prognosis
if the recommendations were carried out was guarded, in my view the plaintiff
should have undertaken the recommendations by the witness she called to give
evidence.  In the circumstances, the plaintiff has failed to mitigate her
damages.  I would reduce the general damages award by one-third to account for
this factor.

VII.          
Special Damages

[48]        
The test for whether expenses claimed as special damages are recoverable
is whether the expenses were reasonable: Lee v. McGuire, 2005
BCSC 241 at para. 16.

[49]        
There is no doubt, and in fact there is no contest, that the plaintiff
incurred significant expenses for various treatments post-accident.  The
matter, however, is complicated because the plaintiff was receiving treatment
for pre-existing back complaints, including massage once a week, prior to the
Accident.  She also had had some physiotherapy treatments.  There is no
specific evidence however concerning the cost of these treatments, or why they
were recommended as there is no medical evidence in that regard.

[50]        
I agree with the defendant’s submission that most of the records
produced by the plaintiff and her oral evidence regarding her claim for special
damages lack the basic information needed to prove they were reasonable.  The
claim for reimbursement of most of these expenses does not meet the standard of
proof required, that is, that on a balance of probabilities, the expenditures
were reasonably necessary to address the plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant
should be legally responsible.

[51]        
For example: (1) records from the Tianjuan Treatment Centre do not
specify the nature of the treatment, the cost of the treatment, nor is there
evidence that this treatment would assist the plaintiff for the injuries she
suffered in the Accident; (2) records from “Perfect Beauty” speak of “back
relaxation method of health preservation”, however, what
the course of treatment was, and why it was recommended for the plaintiff’s
injuries is lacking; (3) the same applies to treatments described as
“lymph drainage”, which the plaintiff said was to “detox your body”, and “12
energy channels massage drainage”; (4) there are invoices for treatments
that are described merely as “rehab”, but no description is given of what the
treatments consisted of or what they were intended to address; (5) there
are invoices for businesses identified as “Foot Spa” and “Gold Medal Foot Reflexology”
but there is again no indication of what the treatments consisted of or how
they related to the injuries suffered; (6) there are invoices for what is
described as traditional Chinese medicine, but there is no description of what
the treatments consisted of, or whether they were passive or of some other
nature.

[52]        
I accept, however, that some passive treatment of the symptoms was
necessary, at least until Dr. Armstrong recommended otherwise.  The defendant
acknowledges that acupuncture treatments are recoverable.  It must be
remembered that the plaintiff was undergoing some treatment consequential to
the 1998 MVA at the time of the Accident.  I would allow the equivalent of one
acupuncture treatment per month for the period between the date of the accident
and the date of Dr. Armstrong’s medical legal report, that is 37 months at
$70 per treatment, or $2,590.  Any amounts already paid should be deducted from
this amount.

VIII.        
Cost of Future Care

[53]        
The leading case on damages for cost of future care is Milina v.
Bartsch [1985] B.C.J. No. 2762, 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 33 (S.C.) (affirmed
on appeal, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1833 (B.C.C.A.)).  As noted by McLachlin J.,
as she then was, at para 199:

These authorities establish (1) that there must be a medical
justification for claims for cost of future care; and (2) that the claims must
be reasonable.  On the latter point, Dickson J. stated in Andrews
at p. 586:

An award must be moderate, and fair to both parties . . .

[54]        
In my view the only costs itemized under this head that are recoverable
are those specified by Dr. Armstrong.  To some degree, the plaintiff may
have already expended those funds.  Given the difficulties with the evidence I
have noted above it seems more appropriate to deal with these as a cost of
future care item.  The costs of these claims are as follows:

(1)      the
cost of gym membership for one year ($600);

(2)      customized
physiotherapy sessions (65 x $90 = $5850);

(3)      clinical
psychologist (25 x $175 = $4375);

(4)      pedometer ($25).

[55]        
I would allow all of these items with the exception of the clinical
psychologist.  In my view it would be necessary that Ms. Hsu first be
assessed by a clinical psychologist to determine whether such was necessary or
would assist in the management of her condition.  Dr. Armstrong is not a
clinical psychologist and is therefore not qualified to give advice in this
regard.  In the circumstances I would allow one visit at $175.

IX.           
Loss of Future Income

[56]        
In order to optimize the chances for success, Dr. Armstrong
recommended that the plaintiff discontinue her employment for a period of 3-4
months then gradually return to work.  Based on her current income of 90,000
New Taiwanese dollars a month, and prevailing conversion rates, I would allow
$10,000 under this head.

X.             
Summary

[57]        
The action is allowed.  The plaintiff is awarded the following sums:

(1)      general damages $20,000
(after deduction of one-third for failure to mitigate;

(2)      special damages $2,590
(less amounts already paid for acupuncture);

(3)      cost of future care $6,650;
and

(4)      loss of future income
$10,000.

XI.           
Order

[58]        
The action is allowed.  If there is an issue as to costs the parties may
make arrangements through the court registry to speak to that issue.

“The Honourable
Mr. Justice Savage”