IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Date: 20110617

Docket: M131973

Registry:
New Westminster

Between:

Marianna Gatzke

Plaintiff

And:

Mandeep Sidhu,
Dharminder Sidhu,

Audrey Strong and
Peter Markey

Defendants

Before:
The Honourable Mr. A. Justice Saunders

Oral Reasons for Judgment

[1]            
THE COURT: The subject motor vehicle accident happened on
January 31, 2006, at the intersection of 64th Avenue and 152nd Street in
Surrey.  It was dark and raining.  The plaintiff was westbound on 64th Avenue;
her evidence is that she was intending to drive further along 64th and eventually
to turn right and proceed north up 144th Street.

[2]            
The plaintiff says that she was driving about 55 kilometres an hour,
consistent with the flow of traffic.  There were no cars immediately in front
of her, but there were cars some distance ahead of her which, as she approached
the intersection with 152nd Street, had already cleared the intersection.

[3]            
Some distance before that intersection, 64th Avenue widens from a single
lane in each direction, to two lanes in each direction.  At that point, the
plaintiff says she moved over into the right-hand lane, that is, the curb lane,
intending to proceed straight through the intersection and to continue on in
that curb lane.  At the intersection with 152nd, that right-hand curb lane is
not reserved for right turning vehicles.

[4]            
At the intersection itself, 64th Avenue widens again creating a lane
exclusively for left turning vehicles.  That lane played no direct role in this
accident.

[5]            
At a point she estimates was perhaps ten car lengths away from the
intersection, the plaintiff testified that she first noticed the defendant’s
vehicle facing her, eastbound on 64th Avenue, stopped in the middle of the
intersection apparently intending to make what would have been, for the
defendant, a left-hand turn onto 152nd, in which she would have been proceeding
north.  152nd Street has two lanes, and so the defendant would have been
intending to turn into the left lane at 152nd.

[6]            
That was the first time the plaintiff saw the defendant’s vehicle.

[7]            
The plaintiff testified that the next time she noticed the defendant’s
vehicle, just a couple of seconds later, the defendant was coming right at
her.  The plaintiff braked, but did not have time to avoid the collision.

[8]            
The defendant’s version of the collision is that she had been stopped on
64th Avenue at the red light.  When the light turned green, she advanced into
the 152nd Street intersection with her left turn signal on and came to a stop. 
She could see the plaintiff’s car approaching in the right hand curb lane.  All
of this so far is consistent with the plaintiff’s version.

[9]            
However, the defendant says that the plaintiff’s right turn signal was
on, and that as the plaintiff approached the intersection she slowed as if intending
to turn right up 152nd.  As the plaintiff appeared to her to be intending to
make a turn and not proceed through the intersection, the defendant judged it
safe to make her turn and did so.

[10]        
The plaintiff did not make a turn.  She proceeded straight into the
intersection. The two vehicles collided.  The defendant had the impression,
although it was only an impression, of the plaintiff speeding up somewhat just
before the accident.

[11]        
In answer to questions from the Court and from counsel, the defendant
gave some time estimates as to the number of seconds she had been stopped in
the intersection and as to the number of seconds it took her to make the turn. 
She also gave estimates of the number of car lengths the plaintiff was away
from her when she commenced making her turn.  These were clearly estimates only
and imprecise, and bearing in mind that the accident happened more than five
years ago, I cannot and do not attach any significance to them, for one party or
the other.

[12]        
There are photographs of the damaged vehicles in evidence.  Damage to
the plaintiff’s vehicle from the impact with the defendant – and I should add
there was evidence of secondary contact with other vehicles following the
initial collision – showed that the primary impact was predominantly to the
front end, perhaps more on the front left than the front right.

[13]        
I do not take this apparently somewhat greater deformation on the left
side of the left corner to be evidence of the plaintiff having started a right
hand turn. In my mind, that asymmetry in the damage, if I could call it that,
is equally explicable as having been the result of the plaintiff perhaps having
made a last minute, split second turn to the right to avoid the collision; the
difference between the left and right side damage to the front of the
plaintiff’s vehicle is that small.

[14]        
The primary damage to the defendant’s vehicle was to the front right. 
The photographs show considerable damage and in my view there must have been
some considerable force to the collision.  I take the location of the damage as
evidence that the nose of the defendant’s vehicle was well into the westbound
curb lane at the point of impact, and from that I conclude that the plaintiff
must have been relatively close to the intersection when the defendant began
her turn.

[15]        
The plaintiff denied under cross-examination that she had her turn
signal on as she approached the intersection.  It was put to her on
cross-examination that she did in fact slow down with the intention of turning
right on 152nd, perhaps mistaking it  for 144th Street, but that she then at
the last second either realized her mistake or changed her mind.  The plaintiff
denied this.

[16]        
My findings on liability are as follows.

[17]        
This is not a case, contrary to the suggestion that was made in the
plaintiff’s opening, of the defendant left-turning driver misjudging the
oncoming plaintiff’s speed, attempting to make the turn in front of the
plaintiff, and simply not making it across the intersection in time.  The
damage on the front of the vehicles indicates that the collision occurred at
the beginning of the process of the vehicles crossing each other’s paths.

[18]        
Both vehicles were there to be seen and, according to the parties, were
seen.

[19]        
I do not think it is likely that the defendant would have begun to
execute her left-hand turn with the plaintiff being so close to entering the
intersection, unless she had good reason to believe that the plaintiff was in
fact going to turn right and not intersect her.

[20]        
I find therefore, as stated by the defendant in her evidence, that as
the plaintiff approached the intersection, having already moved into the
right-hand lane, the plaintiff’s right turn signal was on and the plaintiff did
decelerate.

[21]        
I also find that these were sufficient indications for the defendant to
believe that it was likely the plaintiff was going to turn and sufficient
grounds for the defendant to begin her own turn. In other words, from an
objectively reasonable standpoint, it was not apparent that there would be a
collision if the defendant proceeded.  In that respect, the plaintiff would not
have appeared to have been an immediate hazard, within the meaning of s. 174
of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318. The defendant
therefore, I conclude, was the dominant driver.

[22]        
My conclusion on this point also finds some support in one aspect of the
plaintiff’s own evidence. The plaintiff was clear in her evidence that there
were two distinct points in time when she noticed the defendant’s vehicle.  The
first was when she was approaching the intersection and she noticed the
defendant’s vehicle there in the intersection stopped and waiting to make a
left hand turn. She clearly described that there was a second, distinct time, a
few seconds later, that she noticed the defendant’s vehicle.

[23]        
The manner in which the plaintiff gave her evidence did not suggest to
me that she continuously had the defendant’s vehicle under observation, as
would likely have been the case, in my view, if the plaintiff had been looking
forward intending at all times to drive straight through the intersection.

[24]        
The fact that the plaintiff described her views of the defendant’s
vehicle in this manner suggests to me that her attention was taken away from
the view directly in front of her vehicle for a short time.  That aspect of the
plaintiff’s evidence in my view would tend to support a finding that the
plaintiff was not in fact intending at all times to drive straight through the
intersection. This would be consistent with the defendant’s evidence that the
plaintiff was in fact signalling and that the plaintiff had slowed down,
apparently intending to make a turn.

[25]        
So, as I have stated, I find that the defendant was the dominant
driver.  However, the liability analysis does not end there. As the B.C. Court
of Appeal stated in Salaam v. Abramovic, 2010 BCCA 212, finding
compliance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act is important in
determining whether the parties have met their standard of care, but the
provisions of the Act are not the only consideration.

[26]        
In my view, a prudent driver in the position of the defendant, while entitled
to initiate her own left-hand turn, was not entitled to assume that the
plaintiff would be turning right.  A reasonably prudent driver, in particular
given the prevailing lighting and weather, would have edged forward into the
oncoming centre lane and would not have proceeded into the oncoming right-hand
curb lane until either the plaintiff was right at the intersection and had
slowed her vehicle right down to a minimal turning speed, or until the
plaintiff had actually begun her turn.  Neither of these happened in this case.

[27]        
Therefore, in my view, there was fault on both sides which caused this
collision, and this is a matter for the apportionment of blame under the Negligence
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 333.  Apportionment of blame is based on
relative degrees of moral fault.  I find, in the circumstances of this case, that
fault for this accident lies 70% with the plaintiff and 30% with the defendant.

[28]        
Now, as to the damages. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was a
long- distance truck driver for a company called Load Runner, based in the
Lower Mainland.  She had been working there since January 2005.  At the time of
the accident, the plaintiff was living in Coalmont outside Princeton, British
Columbia and she resided in her home there on her days off.

[29]        
The plaintiff has a history of a variety of medical issues, some of
which have had a bearing on her employment history.  She testified that she has
polycystic syndrome, a hormonal imbalance, which causes, among other things,
fatigue and depression.

[30]        
In the early 2000s the plaintiff worked as a cook at Surrey Memorial
Hospital.  She suffered from left knee pain on that job. The plaintiff’s now-former
general practitioner, Dr. Budau, who gave evidence on her behalf at trial,
referred the plaintiff to an orthopaedic surgeon, a Dr. Maloon, in 2002 to
investigate her left knee complaints.  An x-ray showed mild degenerative
changes, specifically narrowing in the medial aspect of the joint.  The
symptoms of knee pain were attributed by Dr. Maloon to this arthritic
degeneration.

[31]        
By 2004, the plaintiff was complaining to Dr. Budau of swelling in
the knee joint, and she was referred again to Dr. Maloon.  There were two
areas of swelling identified, one above and lateral to the knee cap, the other
just below the knee cap and on the medial side.  Dr. Maloon attributed the
swelling to varicose veins.  This led the plaintiff being referred to a
vascular surgeon who performed a sclerotherapy procedure; as the plaintiff
described it, collapsing the vein.  The plaintiff testified that she continues
to have varicosity and associated tenderness and swelling in the left knee.

[32]        
The plaintiff was laid off in about 2004; it is unclear exactly what
role if any her left knee injury played in that layoff, as the plaintiff’s
evidence was somewhat inconsistent on that point. Because of her knee pain, the
plaintiff decided to get a job which would enable her to sit rather than stand
for lengthy periods of time. This led to her choosing a career in the trucking industry
and she started being trained as a truck driver in November 2004.

[33]        
The plaintiff testified that prior to the accident her left knee was a
continuing source of some discomfort.  She was careful stepping into and out of
her truck.  She had to be careful when stepping on uneven surfaces, such as
docks.  The trucks that she was driving were large rigs with manual
transmissions and she would have to press down with her left foot, putting
pressure on the knee joint, in order to operate the clutch.  Some clutches, she
said, are stiffer than others.  Driving would cause her some discomfort
underneath the left knee cap which she would try to manage by shifting her
weight around and by taking Tylenol.

[34]        
Another one of the plaintiff’s medical issues is her weight.  This has
been a long-standing problem.  She said in evidence that she weighs 300 pounds
and she thinks she has put on about 25 pounds since the accident.  There is no
documentation in the evidence of the plaintiff’s exact weight or of her weight
changes over time. The plaintiff acknowledges having been told by her doctors
prior to the accident that her weight was an issue with respect to her knee
pain.

[35]        
In this action, the plaintiff claims that she suffers ongoing pain in
her left knee because of the accident.  Her left knee struck underneath the
dashboard during the collision.  The plaintiff also alleges that she sustained
various soft tissue injuries and a concussion.

[36]        
The plaintiff’s evidence is that for the first one to three months (she
could not be more sure than that) following the accident she went to stay with
her mother, who lives in the Lower Mainland.  She says that she initially slept
on a cot downstairs because she could not manage the stairs in the house due to
her knee pain.  She says she was in considerable discomfort, that she was
anxious, and suffered from nightmares for about a month.

[37]        
Physiotherapy records in evidence indicate that the plaintiff underwent
physiotherapy in Princeton commencing on February 3rd and continuing through
the months of March and April into early May 2006, for a total of 19 visits. 
The plaintiff could not explain on her cross-examination how or why it was that
she was living with her mother in the Lower Mainland and yet attending
physiotherapy in Princeton.  I do think that the plaintiff embellished her
description of her injuries to some extent in her evidence.  She certainly was
not bedridden.

[38]        
The plaintiff agrees that by the time her physiotherapy concluded in May
2006, she was generally feeling much better.  Her neck pain substantially
resolved within those first three months, although she said that her neck still
occasionally stiffens up.

[39]        
The knee pain, it is alleged, has worsened because of the accident. It
is further alleged that the plaintiff can no longer drive a truck, at least not
a truck with a manual transmission, because of this knee injury.  It is alleged
that the plaintiff has lost jobs since the accident, or has been restricted in
her employment, because of her knee injury.  It is alleged that there is a past
wage loss as well as a loss of earning capacity.

[40]        
In argument the plaintiff cites two decisions on non-pecuniary loss
where the damages were assessed at $60,000 and $75,000.  It was further put
forward in argument that the plaintiff is seeking past loss of income of
$100,000 and damages for loss of capacity and the necessity of retraining at
$100,000.  The latter figure reflects a potential value of the loss of capacity
of more than $400,000, which it is acknowledged would be subject to significant
contingencies in the future, given her pre-existing medical conditions and
other issues as well.

[41]        
In support of her claim, the plaintiff tendered one expert report, that
of Dr. Budau, who as I have already described is her now-former general
practitioner.  Dr. Budau had been the plaintiff’s GP for some years prior
to the subject January 2006 motor vehicle accident, and continued to provide
care for her until December 2007.

[42]        
Dr. Budau last assessed the plaintiff’s knee in July 2007.  An MRI
of the knee had been ordered at that time.  The MRI report was received by Dr. Budau
in December 2007 and showed "no significant abnormality" in the
knee.  The MRI also noted multiple varicosities under the skin which Dr. Budau
acknowledged cannot be attributed to the subject accident.

[43]        
Dr. Budau, whose office is in Langley, first assessed the plaintiff
following the accident on February 6, 2006.  He diagnosed a mild concussion
producing some problems with the plaintiff’s memory and deceleration injuries
affecting the neck,  thoracic and lumbar spine, and right shoulder.  Dr. Budau
noted blunt trauma to the head and possible blunt trauma to the left knee.  He
advised the plaintiff to take physiotherapy, ordered an abdominal ultrasound,
and advised her to take Tylenol or Advil as needed for her pain.

[44]        
In addition to those injuries that I have already described, the
plaintiff complains of ongoing hip tenderness and ankle pain.  Dr. Budau
does not and has not attributed these problems in his report to the accident.

[45]        
In cross-examination, Dr. Budau agreed that the plaintiff’s soft
tissue injuries followed the expected course of gradual improvement. Dr. Budau
certified the plaintiff as fit to return to work as of May 2, 2006.

[46]        
The plaintiff, over the following year-and-a-half or more, had a sketchy
job history.  Following the plaintiff’s loss of a couple of jobs, Dr. Budau
again certified to Employment Canada in December 2007 that the plaintiff was
physically fit to begin undertaking training as a psychiatric nurse.

[47]        
With respect to the knee injury in particular, which is the particular
basis upon which the plaintiff asserts a significant loss of earning capacity, Dr. Budau
in his report acknowledges the plaintiff’s pre-existing knee problems, but he
writes as follows at p. 5 of his report:

There were no further injuries
[and here he has been referring to injuries up to and including January 15th,
2004] pertaining to her left knee up until the motor vehicle accident. 
Unfortunately, I am not aware as to whether there was or was not intervening
symptomatology pertaining to this knee.  In general, however, where here is
such a pre-existing condition, it is not unusual for it to worsen immediately
after a traumatic event and remain at a heightened level of symptomatology for
some time thereafter.  In most cases I would expect the problem to settle back
down to the pre-accident level.  Unfortunately, in some cases it does not
follow that pattern and can continue to grumble along at an increased level of discomfort
or in fact escalate significantly.  In Ms. Gatzke’s case, according to my
recollection, it was definitely grumbling along at a more intense level than it
had been before the motor vehicle accident.  Having said that, it can be
expected to continue to be bothersome at a greater intensity than before the
accident. There was an x-ray done of this knee in 2004 which was normal.  The
x-ray of January 31, 2006 showed early arthritic change so it seems there is a
degenerative process going on.  It is likely that the effects of this accident
made this knee symptomatic sooner and more severe than would have been expected
without the accident.

[48]        
Dr. Budau then continues in the next paragraph and concludes:

As stated above, the accident of
January 31, 2006 in my opinion rendered the left knee more symptomatic sooner
than would have been expected and therefore contributing to the need to change
careers.

[49]        
It is on the basis of this opinion that the plaintiff contends that the
accident is still responsible for her ongoing knee problems.

[50]        
There are several problems with Dr. Budau’s opinion.

[51]        
First, if Dr. Budau is correct, the question begged by his report
is the degree to which the accident worsened the plaintiff’s symptoms and/or
accelerated the degenerative process.  Dr. Budau has not assessed the
plaintiff’s knee over the last nearly four years and is in no position to say
to what extent the plaintiff’s present complaints reflect the pre-existing knee
conditions.  I say “conditions” in the plural, referring to both the varicose vein
issue and the arthritis.  Dr. Budau is in no position to say to what
extent the plaintiff’s present complaints reflect the pre-existing knee
conditions, or the accident, or some other cause.

[52]        
Second, Dr. Budau acknowledges having had an incomplete picture of
the plaintiff’s knee condition prior to the accident.  There is no evidence of Dr. Budau
having been aware of the plaintiff’s knee complaints during the time period
between early 2004, when Dr. Budau received Dr. Maloon’s second consultation
report, up to the January 31st, 2006 accident.  In particular, Dr. Budau did
not testify to having any awareness of the plaintiff’s continuing knee symptoms
once she took up truck driving in November 2004.  Furthermore, in providing
this expert report to counsel for the purpose of this litigation, Dr. Budau
had apparently not been given any assumptions to make as to the plaintiff’s
knee condition during that time period.  Dr. Budau therefore, in my view,
was and is in no position to qualitatively evaluate changes between the
plaintiff’s pre- and post-accident condition, at least as far as her condition at
the present time is concerned.

[53]        
Third, Dr. Budau did not, in his report, discuss or even
acknowledge the role played by varicose veins in the plaintiff’s pre-accident history
of knee complaints, except to note, with respect to the 2007 post-accident MRI,
that he could not attribute the varicosities to the accident.  Dr. Budau’s
report is completely silent on this issue.  Questioned about this on cross-examination,
Dr. Budau said, referring to Dr. Maloon’s consultation report, that
he was not impressed with Dr. Maloon’s findings as to the varicosity.  Dr. Budau
also attempted to excuse this gap in the report by saying that he just did not
view the varicose veins as relevant.  I was not impressed that Dr. Budau
had thoroughly and fairly considered the evidence available to him from the two
specialists, the orthopaedic surgeon and the vascular surgeon, before
formulating his opinion.

[54]        
Fourth, Dr. Budau agreed on cross-examination that by no later than
December 2006, the plaintiff’s knee symptoms had likely returned to their pre-accident
state.  Yet, in his report, Dr. Budau attributed the plaintiff’s
continuing knee complaints in 2007 at least in part to the accident.  It is not
clear to me how both of these propositions could be true without the accident
having actually triggered further degenerative changes in the knee joint; but,
there is no radiological evidence that the degeneration is in fact any more
severe than it was in 2004.  Without such evidence, to say that there is any
link between the accident and the knee complaints from 2007 onwards is, in my
view, simply conjecture on Dr. Budau’s part.

[55]        
Dr. Budau’s opinion, I find, does not assist the plaintiff in
establishing that her knee complaints since January 2007 are or have been
related to the accident.

[56]        
The defence tendered the report of an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Sovio,
who examined the plaintiff in May of this year.  Dr. Sovio’s report was
blunt and his evidence on cross-examination was forceful.  He is of the opinion
that orthopedically there is nothing wrong with the plaintiff’s left knee.  He
could find nothing wrong: in his words, "end of statement".

[57]        
It was argued on the plaintiff’s behalf that Dr. Sovio’s inability
to find an orthopaedic cause does not mean that the plaintiff is not in fact
suffering from an orthopaedic problem that could be attributed to the accident. 
I find that unlikely.

[58]        
Dr. Sovio stated on cross-examination that the type of degenerative
changes in the patient’s knee in the medial compartment are not the type which
are usually connected to trauma.  Furthermore, he said the bony growths, or osteophytes,
which are present would be "extremely unlikely" to be caused by
trauma.

[59]        
On cross-examination, Dr. Sovio was questioned as to a statement
made in his report to the effect that the family physician’s notes appear to
indicate that the family physician felt that the patient’s problems were not
related to the motor vehicle accident.  In respect of that statement in his
report, Dr. Sovio was confronted with Dr. Budau’s opinion.  As it
turns out, in making that statement, Dr. Sovio was not referring to Dr. Budau. 
Dr. Sovio was referring to notes he had been given of the plaintiff’s
current general practitioner, or if not current, at least current at the time
this note was made, a Dr. David Smith.

[60]        
In particular, Dr. Sovio referenced a clinical note of Dr. Smith’s
dated January 31, 2009.  My note of Dr. Sovio’s evidence as to what is in Dr. Smith’s
notes is as follows:

A difficult patient, convinced
swelling of knee is related to her MVA.  This is not so.  This is a difficult
patient.

[61]        
Now, the clinical notes of Dr. Smith are not in evidence, and Dr. Sovio’s
reference to those notes therefore is problematic. However, the point emerged
in cross-examination and I cannot ignore it completely. The statements made by Dr. Sovio
of Dr. Smith’s opinion are clearly not admissible as evidence of Dr. Smith’s
opinion, and I do not treat them on that basis.  However it is apparent, from
that evidence having been given by Dr. Sovio, that the plaintiff has
continued to seek treatment from other doctors of her knee problem.

[62]        
The failure of the plaintiff to call evidence from that treating doctor
or doctors opens up the possibility of me drawing an adverse inference, that
is, an inference, arising from the plaintiff’s failure to call that evidence, that
the plaintiff is reluctant to call that evidence because it is adverse or
unhelpful to the plaintiff’s case.

[63]        
Given in particular that we have no other medical evidence of the
plaintiff’s knee condition since she ceased treatment with Dr. Budau, and
given that the plaintiff is alleging a continuing significant injury of the
sort which I would have expected would lead her to continue to seek treatment
or consultations in order to find a cure or relief of some sort, in my view it
is entirely appropriate for me to draw such an adverse inference in this case. 
I find that the plaintiff has in fact been seeking treatment from at least one
other doctor regarding her left knee pain and I infer that the opinion of that
other doctor or doctors is that there is no connection between her knee pain
and the subject accident.

[64]        
The plaintiff has not established on a balance of probabilities that her
continuing knee complaints were caused by the motor vehicle accident.

[65]        
The evidence establishes that the plaintiff has encountered difficulties
staying employed since the accident. The evidence does not establish that these
difficulties are due to her knee complaints. Clearly there have been other
issues that the plaintiff has encountered including disagreements with her
employers, customers, or co-workers.

[66]        
There is no evidence in this case sufficient to support a finding of any
loss of future earning capacity.

[67]        
I find that as a result of the accident, the plaintiff suffered soft
tissue injuries, a concussion, and aggravation of a pre-existing knee problem,
all of which disabled her from employment for a period of three months.  I
further find that there was substantial resolution of all of those problems
within no more than the following nine months.

[68]        
As to the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages, the defence has provided a
helpful range of authorities which are roughly similar, although of course no
case is perfectly analogous by any means, that would put the plaintiff’s
damages in the range of $20,000 to $30,000.  I believe that is a fair estimate
and that the cases provided are a fair reflection of how damages in this case
ought to be assessed.  I set her non-pecuniary damages at $25,000.

[69]        
I find that the plaintiff’s income loss is limited to three months.  As
best I can on the available evidence, I quantify that by putting the amount of
damages at $6,500.

[70]        
In addition, the defendant has volunteered that she will accept
liability for the user-fee component of the physiotherapy costs incurred by the
plaintiff with the physiotherapist in Princeton for the time period immediately
after the accident for those first three months, and I so order.  There is no
evidence as to what that amount is.  There is no evidence of any other special
damages.

[71]        
In summary, the non-pecuniaries damages are $25,000; past income loss is
$6,500; physiotherapy user fees will be allowed as special damages; and the
plaintiff will be have judgment for 30 percent of those damages, in accordance
with my finding on liability.

[SUBMISSIONS BY COUNSEL RE COSTS]

[72]        
THE COURT: Defendant’s counsel will provide a written submission
on costs by Friday, July 15th, and the plaintiff’s reply submissions no later
than Tuesday, August 2, 2011.

[73]        
I am sincerely indebted to both counsel for your submissions this
morning.  You were both most thorough and you both dealt with the evidence in a
very fair manner which was of great assistance to the Court in deliberating.

“A. Saunders J.”