IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Date: 20100615

Docket: S041294

Registry: Vancouver

Between:

Glen William
MacIntyre aka Evan William MacIntyre, Infant

an Infant, by his Litigation
Guardian Valmai MacIntyre

Plaintiff

And

Pitt Meadows
Secondary School and Board of School Trustees

District No. 42
(Maple Ridge)

Defendants

And

Ryan Khunkhun, an
infant,

by his Guardian Ad
Litem, Daljit Khunkhun

Third
Party

Docket: M045251

Registry: Vancouver

Between:

Glen
Evan William MacIntyre aka Evan William MacIntyre, Infant
an Infant, by his Litigation Guardian Valmai MacIntyre

Plaintiff

And

Ruby
Wilson

Defendant

Docket: M082415

Registry: Vancouver

Between:

Glen
Evan William MacIntyre

Plaintiff

And

Shawn
Lever, Wolfe Chevrolet Ltd.,
and Haakon Industries (Canada) Ltd.

Defendants

Before:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Butler

Ruling on Costs

[1]            
On March 1, 2010, I delivered reasons for judgment in three actions
brought by Evan MacIntyre for personal injuries: MacIntyre v. Pitt Meadows
Secondary School, 2010 BCSC 256.  The three actions were heard at the same
time.  I dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in the action which arose out of an
injury suffered at Pitt Meadows Secondary School on September 19, 2002 when a
lawn mower engine fell on his wrist during shop class (the “First Action”).  I
awarded $38,282.85 in damages for the injuries suffered in a motor vehicle
accident that occurred on October 31, 2003 (the “Second Action”).  I awarded
$36,977.03 in damages for the injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident
that occurred on October 31, 2007 (the “Third Action”).  I ordered that costs
should follow the event at Scale B subject to any submissions of the parties. 
Having heard the submissions of the parties, this is my ruling on the numerous
costs issues raised by them.

Relevant Background

[2]            
In the First Action, the plaintiff filed a statement of claim naming
Pitt Meadows Secondary School and the Board of School Trustees District
No. 42 (Maple Ridge) (collectively the “School”) and Ryan Khunkhun (the
“Third Party”) as defendants.  On January 2, 2007, the School filed and served
a third party notice claiming contribution and indemnity from the Third Party. 
On February 27, 2007, the plaintiff filed a notice of discontinuance against
the Third Party.  On January 9, 2009, the Third Party made an offer to settle
pursuant to Rule 37B to the School whereby he offered to waive costs and
disbursements in exchange for a consent dismissal order.  The School made an
offer to settle pursuant to Rule 37B to the plaintiff on January 14, 2009
whereby it offered to waive costs and disbursements in exchange for a consent
dismissal order.

[3]            
The defendants in the Second Action and the Third Action (the “Motor
Vehicle Defendants”) were represented by the same counsel at the trial of these
matters.  The Motor Vehicle Defendants made a global offer to settle those two
actions in the amount of approximately $60,000.  The amount awarded as damages
exceeded that offer.

[4]            
The trial lasted 14 days.  Counsel for the defendants in each action
remained in attendance throughout the whole of the trial.  This was primarily
because the damage issues in the three actions were interconnected.  In the
First Action, liability was hotly contested.  The Motor Vehicle Defendants
admitted liability.  According to the estimate of Mr. Marquardt, counsel for
the Motor Vehicle Defendants, approximately four to five days of the trial was
taken up with evidence and argument relating to liability in the First Action
and nine or ten days was occupied by evidence or argument relating to the
damage issues.  I accept that estimate as generally accurate.

Positions of the Parties

The Plaintiff

[5]            
Against that background I can now set out the positions of the parties. 
The plaintiff argues that in the circumstances of this case the only practical
solution is a form of “rough justice”.  The plaintiff says that I should not
attempt a minute dissection of the success or failure of the litigants or
attempt to finely parse the proceedings and evidence with a view to dividing
costs.  Rather, the plaintiff says that the costs order should be based on an
assumption that each action took approximately one-third of the trial time. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of assessing trial preparation and attendance costs,
the plaintiff should receive two-thirds of his taxable costs from the Motor
Vehicle Defendants.  Further, the School should receive one-third of its
taxable costs for trial preparation and attendance from the plaintiff.  In
addition, the plaintiff in the Second Action and Third Action and the School in
the First Action should receive 100% of their taxable costs and disbursements
(other than the trial preparation and attendance costs) against the
unsuccessful parties to those actions.

[6]            
The plaintiff argues that this approach would achieve a just result. 
The plaintiff would not be required to pay the full amount of the trial costs
of the School and the Motor Vehicle Defendants would not have to pay the full
amount of the plaintiff’s costs.  This result would be equitable for a number
of reasons.  The plaintiff, who was successful in two of the actions, would not
see his costs completely offset by the full costs of the School.  The School
would not receive costs for the portions of the trial in which they had no
active involvement and the Motor Vehicle Defendants would not have to pay costs
for the portion of the trial in which they had no active involvement.

[7]            
The plaintiff says that the School should not be entitled to double
costs even though he rejected the School’s offer to waive costs in exchange for
a consent dismissal.  He says it was not an offer that ought reasonably to have
been accepted as it offered no benefit to the plaintiff.  He also argues that
the relative financial circumstances are a factor.  The plaintiff is a young
man just starting his working career and has no assets and a limited income. 
The School is a large institution that is well funded.  Further, the plaintiff
says that a significant factor to consider is that the plaintiff attempted to
have liability in the First Action tried separately but the School opposed
severance of that issue.

[8]            
The plaintiff also argues that there is no reason to depart from the
usual rule that would require the School to pay the costs of the Third Party. 
He says that he discontinued the case against the Third Party early on and
there was no reason for the School to maintain the third party action.

The School

[9]            
The School argues that it should be entitled to the whole of its costs
rather than just one-third.  It says that the damage issues arising from the
three accidents were substantially intertwined and that a significant portion
of the time was spent on past and future income loss issues based on the
combination of the injuries from the three accidents.  The School also says
that its offer ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff.  If it
had been accepted, there would have been a significant saving of time for the
court.  The offer gave notice to the plaintiff long before the trial commenced
that the School was taking a strong position on liability.  The plaintiff
proceeded to trial knowing of the risk that he could lose on liability and be
subject to a double costs award.

[10]        
With respect to the Third Party’s costs, the School acknowledges that it
has the burden of demonstrating that the usual rule (that a defendant who joins
a third party is responsible to pay the costs of the third party) should not
apply.  It argues that the Third Party was brought into the action by the
plaintiff and that it had no real alternative but to join the Third Party and
maintain those proceedings.  Even after the plaintiff discontinued his claim
against the Third Party, he maintained his allegation that the Third Party may
have loosened the vice in which the motor mount was placed.  As a result, the
School argues it had no alternative but to pursue the third party proceedings.

The Motor Vehicle Defendants

[11]        
The Motor Vehicle Defendants do not oppose the plaintiff’s suggestion
that they should pay only two-thirds of the trial preparation and attendance
costs.  However, they also argue that this is an appropriate case in which to
award costs and disbursements to the Motor Vehicle Defendants for a portion of
the proceedings pursuant to Rule 57(15).  The plaintiff’s claims for future
opportunity loss and cost of future care were unsuccessful.  The evidence took
approximately one day of trial.  The Motor Vehicle Defendants seek an order
that the plaintiff pay the costs for one day of trial and disbursements for
expert advisors relating to those issues and that he be denied one day of costs
and his expert disbursements relating to those issues.  In the alternative, the
Motor Vehicle Defendants say that the plaintiff should be denied his costs and
disbursements for those issues.

The Third Party

[12]        
The Third Party argues that he should be entitled to the full costs of
defending the third party action from the School and double costs from January
16, 2009 onwards.  The Third Party supports the plaintiff’s argument that there
is no reason why the plaintiff should be paid his costs.  However, if that
order is made, he argues that the plaintiff should pay his full costs of
defending the third party action.  The Third Party says there would be an
unjust result if the costs relating to trial time were divided up in some
manner to reflect the time spent dealing with the three actions.  This is
because the issues were intertwined and counsel was required to attend trial
for all 14 days.

Issues

[13]        
These circumstances raise the following costs issues:

1.       Should
the successful parties in each action receive costs for the full trial or only
some portion of it?

2.       Should
the School be awarded double costs pursuant to Rule 37B after delivery on
January 14, 2009 of its offer to waive costs in exchange for a consent
dismissal?

3.       Should the School pay
the costs of the Third Party?

4.       Should
the Third Party be awarded double costs pursuant to Rule 37B after delivery on
January 9, 2009 of his offer to waive costs in exchange for a consent
dismissal?

5.       Should
the Motor Vehicle Defendants be awarded costs and disbursements pursuant to
Rule 57(15) because the plaintiff was unsuccessful in his claims for future
opportunity loss and cost of future care?

Issue 1.   Should the
successful parties in each action receive costs for the full trial or only some
portion of it?

[14]        
The court is given a broad discretion with respect to costs.  The
discretion must be exercised judicially.  The objective of all rules relating
to costs is to effect a just result between parties: Moore v. Castlegar and
District Hospital (1998), 59 B.C.L.R. (3d) 368 (C.A.).  Further, pursuant
to Rule 57(15), the court may award costs that relate to a part of the
proceeding.

[15]        
I accept the submission of the plaintiff that the circumstances of this
case are such that it would be unjust to award to the successful parties 100%
of their costs for the whole trial.  The unfairness arises primarily because
the liability issue in the First Action was not tried separately.  The
plaintiff attempted to have that issue severed for trial but the School opposed
severance of the liability and damage issues.  The parties all accepted that
there was a need to have the damage issues in the three actions tried together.
This meant that the liability issue in the First Action was heard with the
damage issues and there was a prolonged proceeding.  Frequently during the
trial, one of the defendants or the Third Party was not actively involved with
a witness or an issue.

[16]        
In these circumstances, there would be some unfairness to the parties
who lost one or more issues if costs were awarded for 100% of the trial
preparation and attendance.  If the plaintiff was awarded costs for the whole
of the trial it would be unfair because he was unsuccessful in the action that
took the most time. If the School received 100% of its costs it would be unfair
because it was not involved in many of the damage issues.  Further, the School
would receive a disproportionate amount of costs when compared with the
plaintiff, even though the plaintiff was successful in two of the actions.  Similarly,
it would be unfair to the Motor Vehicle Defendants if they had to pay 100% of
the costs when they had no involvement in the First Action.

[17]        
The plaintiff’s suggestion that the trial costs should be divided
between the three actions is a sensible and fair way of dealing with the
problem created by the circumstances of this case.  This is an appropriate case
to award costs to the parties for parts of the proceeding.  The jurisdiction to
make this order is inherent and it comes from Rule 57(15).  I also agree with
the plaintiff’s submission that it would be impossible to determine with any
precision the time spent on the three actions.  This is because of the
extensive overlap in the damage issues.  However, I do not agree that the
appropriate way to divide the costs is one-third to each action.  This is
because there is no doubt that the time spent on the First Action was greater
than the time spent on each of the other two actions.  I find that the fair way
to divide the trial costs between the three actions is to allocate 40% of those
costs to the First Action and 30% to each of the other two actions.

[18]        
I accept the plaintiff’s suggestion that it is appropriate to allow the
parties to work out the costs and disbursements associated with each action
other than the trial preparation and attendance costs.

[19]        
Accordingly, I order that the plaintiff recover from the Motor Vehicle
Defendants 60% of his trial preparation and attendance costs as well as 100% of
his other costs and disbursements relating to those two actions.  I also order
that the School recover 40% of its trial preparation and attendance costs from
the plaintiff.  In making this order I am taking into account the fact that the
School chose to have the liability trial heard at the same time as the damage
issues.  While it may have had valid reasons for that choice, in the circumstances
of this case it would not be fair to require the plaintiff to pay all of the
School’s costs for the prolonged proceeding.  Also, the plaintiff shall pay
100% of the School’s costs and disbursements incurred in the First Action other
than those related to trial preparation and attendance.

Issue 2.   Should the School
be awarded double costs pursuant to Rule 37B after delivery on January 14, 2009
of its offer to waive costs in exchange for a consent dismissal?

[20]        
The relevant provisions of Rule 37B are:

(5)   In a
proceeding in which an offer to settle has been made, the court may do one or
more of the following:

…

(b)   award double costs of all or
some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery of the
offer to settle;

…

(6)   In
making an order under subrule (5), the court may consider the following:

(a)   whether the offer to settle
was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted, either on the date that
the offer to settle was delivered or on any later date;

(b)   the relationship between the
terms of settlement offered and the final judgment of the court;

(c)   the relative financial
circumstances of the parties;

(d)   any other factor the court considers appropriate.

[21]        
The plaintiff’s opposition to an award of double costs is based
primarily on his argument that the School’s offer was not one that ought
reasonably to have been accepted.  In light of the offer and the circumstances
of this case, I agree.

[22]        
The wrist injury suffered by the plaintiff in the school accident has
resulted in a permanent disability.  That injury is, without question, the most
serious of the injuries claimed in the three actions.  The plaintiff is of the
view that the injury impacted his future employment opportunities such that he
has suffered a significant loss.  While I did not assess that claim, it would
likely have had a substantial value.  I infer that this concern was
instrumental in the plaintiff’s decision to pursue the litigation.  While the
claim against the School was unsuccessful, it was not frivolous.  The liability
issue required a careful analysis of all of the circumstances as well as
consideration of expert evidence.

[23]        
The School’s offer of settlement, if it had been accepted, did not
confer any benefit on the plaintiff.  It did not even include an offer to pay
the plaintiff’s costs incurred up to that date.  It merely restated the
School’s position that it thought it had no liability.  It was not unreasonable
for the plaintiff to refuse the offer and pursue his claim.  Offers that do not
confer a benefit on an unsuccessful offeree are less likely to give rise to a
double costs order than offers that do confer a real benefit: BCSPCA v.
Baker, 2008 BCSC 947.

[24]        
This issue was recently considered in Giles v. Westminster Savings
and Credit Union, 2010 BCCA 282.  The comments of Frankel J.A. at paras. 88
and 89 are applicable to the present case:

I appreciate there are no mandatory factors under Rule 37B(6)
and that trial judges have discretion to take into account whatever factors
they consider appropriate in a given case.  However, the ultimate discretion as
to double costs must be exercised in a just, principled, and consistent way. 
One of the goals of Rule 37B is to promote settlement by imposing consequences
on parties who have refused to accept an offer that ought reasonably to have
been accepted.  While it may not invariably be the case, I consider that it
would be generally antithetical to that goal to penalize an unsuccessful
plaintiff with double costs for proceeding to trial in the face of an
unreasonable offer.  Virtually all litigation comes with a degree of risk. 
When faced with settlement offers, plaintiffs must carefully consider their
positions.  However, they should not be cowed into accepting an unreasonable
offer out of fear of being penalized with double costs if they are unable to
“beat” that offer.  Put somewhat differently, plaintiffs should not be
penalized for declining an offer that did not provide a genuine incentive to
settle in the circumstances. …

I am also of the view that when
an offer made by a defendant for the purpose of achieving a pre-trial
settlement is reasonably refused, the mere fact that the action is ultimately
dismissed in its entirety is not a consideration with respect to double costs.

[25]        
In the circumstances of this case, it would not be equitable for the
plaintiff to be penalized for declining an offer that did not provide a genuine
incentive to settle.

Issue 3.   Should the School pay the costs of the Third Party?

[26]        
The usual rule is that costs follow the event such that a successful
third party is entitled to its costs against the defendant who issued the third
party notice.  The plaintiff, even if unsuccessful against the defendant, is
usually not liable to pay the costs of the third party directly: Wilson v.
INA Insurance Co. of Canada (1998), 112 B.C.A.C. 208.  A party who asks
that the usual rule not be followed has the burden of demonstrating that the
rule should be displaced: Grassi v. WIC Radio Ltd., 2001 BCCA 376.

[27]        
There may be situations where fairness requires that an unsuccessful
plaintiff pay a successful third party’s costs.  In Milina v. Bartsch
(1985), 63 B.C.L.R. 122 at 123 (S.C.), McLachlin J. (as she then was) described
when such an order might be considered:

Courts have held that such an order may be appropriate where
one or more of the following situations was present:

1.         Where
the main issue litigated was between the plaintiff and the third party:

2.         Where
the third party was brought or kept in the matter by reason of the act or
neglect of the plaintiff:

3.         Where
the case involves a string of contracts in substantially the same terms for the
sale of goods:

4.         Where the third party
proceedings follow naturally and inevitably upon the institution of the
plaintiff’s action, in the sense that the defendant had no real alternative but
to join the third party: [Citations omitted.]

[28]        
The School argues that both the second and fourth situations are present
in this case such that the plaintiff should pay the Third Party’s costs.  There
is no question that the Third Party was originally brought into the First
Action because the plaintiff named him as a defendant.  However, there is
nothing about the circumstances of this case that, as a matter of fairness,
require the plaintiff to pay the Third Party’s costs.

[29]        
The plaintiff alleged in the statement of claim that the Third Party
loosened the vice in which the motor mount was placed.  However, the plaintiff
admitted on discovery early in the proceedings that he did not see this occur.  The
allegation in the statement of claim was based only on the plaintiff’s
recollection that the Third Party was in the vicinity of the vice and, thus, he
had an opportunity to loosen it.  It was common knowledge that other
individuals, including the plaintiff, also had the opportunity to loosen it.  There
was no other evidence against the Third Party.  Given these facts, the
plaintiff determined that he did not have a sustainable claim against the Third
Party.  He discontinued the action against the Third Party on February 27,
2007.

[30]        
As the case proceeded to trial and the plaintiff delivered his expert
reports, it would have been obvious to the School that the claims against it
were based on allegations that the School provided damaged or faulty equipment
to the students or that the supervision of Mr. Dunning, the shop teacher, was
inadequate.  The claim was not based on negligence of the Third Party or other
students.  The evidence in support of the third party claim was remarkably
thin.  If the School was of the view that the Third Party was a necessary
witness, he could have been subpoenaed.  However, the School knew long before
trial that the Third Party had no recollection of the alleged incident.

[31]        
In these circumstances, there was no basis whatsoever for the School
maintaining the third party action.  The suggestion that the School had no real
alternative but to maintain the third party claim is without substance.  The
School relied upon the decision in Norman v. McMillan, 2004 BCSC 384, in
support of its argument.  In Norman, the third party action was
commenced because one of the plaintiff’s expert reports directly raised an
issue regarding the negligence of the third party mother.  The present
circumstances are distinguishable from the situation in that case.  There was
nothing in the plaintiff’s expert reports nor in the manner he pursued the
claim that required the School to persist with the third party proceedings once
the plaintiff discontinued his action against the Third Party.

[32]        
There is no reason to depart from the usual order.  The School will pay
the costs of the Third Party.  In accordance with my ruling on the first issue,
the School will pay 40% of the costs of the Third Party for preparation and
attendance at trial.  The School will pay 100% of the Third Party’s other costs
and disbursements.

Issue 4.   Should the Third
Party be awarded double costs pursuant to Rule 37B after delivery on January 9,
2009 of his offer to waive costs in exchange for a consent dismissal?

[33]        
The Third Party claims that he should be entitled to double costs from
January 16, 2009, one week after he delivered the offer to waive his costs in
exchange for a consent dismissal order.  The determination of this issue
depends upon whether or not the Third Party’s offer was one that ought
reasonably to have been accepted by the School pursuant to Rule 37B(6)(a).  I
have no hesitation in concluding that it was an offer that ought reasonably to
have been accepted.

[34]        
As this was a third party claim in a personal injury case, the issue of
whether or not a benefit was conferred by the offer has little relevance in
determining whether or not the offer was reasonable and ought reasonably to
have been accepted.  The question should be determined based on the merits of
the third party claim, the risks facing the defendant, and the facts known to
the defendant at the time of the offer.  When the offer was made on January 9,
2009, examinations for discovery had been held and the plaintiff had, two years
earlier, discontinued the claim against the Third Party.  It should have been
abundantly clear to the School that the third party claim had little merit.  The
School knew that the plaintiff would not be pursuing claims of negligence
against the Third Party and that the School had no evidence to support its own
claim of negligence against the Third Party.  In these circumstances, a refusal
to award double costs would ignore the important deterrent function of the
rules: Bailey v. Jang, 2008 BCSC 1372.

[35]        
In deciding to award double costs, I have also taken into account the
fact that my ruling apportioning costs to the three actions has the effect of
reducing the trial costs that would otherwise be awarded to the Third Party.  By
awarding double costs, the Third Party will recover almost the full amount of
his trial costs at Scale B which is appropriate in the circumstances given my views
regarding the merits of the third party claim.

[36]        
I order that the Third Party is entitled to recover his taxable costs
and disbursements from the School for the period from the service of the third
party notice until January 16, 2009.  Those costs will be taxed at Scale B.  The
Third Party is entitled to recover double costs from January 16, 2009 onwards
including his costs for trial preparation and attendance.  The disbursements
will be allowed only in the amount incurred and not at a double rate.

Issue 5.   Should the Motor
Vehicle Defendants be awarded costs and disbursements pursuant to Rule 57(15)
because the plaintiff was unsuccessful in his claims for future opportunity
loss and cost of future care?

[37]        
The leading case regarding the application of Rule 57(15) is Sutherland
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 BCCA 27.  A trial judge has the
discretion to make the kind of order sought by the Motor Vehicle Defendants
where the following three criteria are met:

a)       the
party seeking apportionment has established that there are separate and
discrete issues upon which the ultimately unsuccessful party succeeded at
trial;

b)       there
is a basis upon which the trial judge can identify the time attributable to the
trial of these separate issues; and

c)       apportionment would effect
a just result.

[38]        
In the circumstances of this case, I am not prepared to order any
further apportionment of the costs.  I decided, as I have described under Issue
1, that this is an appropriate case to apportion costs as between the separate
actions.  In my view, this award already gives the Motor Vehicle Defendants
much of the relief they are seeking.  This is because by awarding only 60% of
the trial costs against the Motor Vehicle Defendants, they will not have to pay
costs to the plaintiff for the time spent at trial on the liability issues and
some of the damage issues arising from the First Action.

[39]        
The purpose of Rule 57(15) is to give trial judges the discretion to effect
a just result between parties in cases that have been prolonged by issues that
the party who would otherwise be entitled to costs has lost: British
Columbia v. Worthington (Canada) Inc. (1988), 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 at 167
(C.A.).  It is important to note in this case that the claims for future
opportunity loss and cost of future care were substantially based on the
injuries suffered in the school accident.  Accordingly, this is not a case
where the trial was prolonged by issues in the Second and Third Actions.  Rather,
it was a case where the plaintiff lost on all issues in the First Action.  The
plaintiff has paid the price in costs by the order I have made.  No further
apportionment is necessary to effect a just result.

[40]        
Further, applications to apportion costs should not become regular
features of litigation, but should be limited to relatively rare cases: Hammond
v. Association of British Columbia Professional Foresters, [1992] B.C.J.
No. 3026 (S.C.).  Here, the evidence relating to the issue in question
occupied only one day out of 14 trial days.  It would unnecessarily complicate
costs applications if parties frequently litigated apportionment of an issue
that occupied less than 10% of trial time in a three week trial.

[41]        
In addition, I agree with the plaintiff’s submission that the
circumstances of this case are more similar to those in Salvatierra v.
Vancouver (City), 2008 BCSC 860, than the cases referred to by the Motor
Vehicle Defendants.  In Salvatierra, Sigurdson J. stated at
para. 17:

Although the plaintiff was not
awarded damages for loss of earning capacity, I do not think that this was a
sufficiently distinct or discrete issue such that costs can be identified that
are attributable to it and in fairness be awarded to the defendants.

[42]        
In this case, the future loss issues were intertwined with the damage
issues generally and it would not be fair to isolate those issues for the
purposes of an apportionment of costs.

Summary

[43]        
The trial costs are to be divided between the three actions in the
following way:  40% of the costs to the First Action and 30% to each of the
other two actions.

[44]        
The plaintiff is entitled to recover 60% of his trial preparation and
attendance costs from the Motor Vehicle Defendants, split evenly between the
two.  He also is entitled to recover 100% of his other costs and disbursements
incurred in the Second and Third Actions from the Motor Vehicle Defendants,
split evenly between the two.

[45]        
The School is entitled to recover from the plaintiff 40% of its trial
preparation and attendance costs.  It also is entitled to recover from the
plaintiff 100% of its other costs and disbursements incurred in the First
Action.  The School is not entitled to double costs after delivery of its offer
of settlement to the plaintiff.

[46]        
The Third Party is entitled to recover from the School 40% of his trial
preparation and attendance costs and 100% of his other costs and
disbursements.  He also is entitled to double his other costs from January 16,
2009 onwards and double his costs for trial preparation and attendance.  He is not
entitled to double his disbursements.

[47]        
The Motor Vehicle Defendants are not entitled to any costs or
disbursements as a result of the plaintiff being unsuccessful in his claim for
future opportunity loss and cost of future care.

“Butler J.”