IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
Citation: | Gonopolsky v. Hammerston, |
| 2015 BCSC 2006 |
Date: 20151103
Docket: M147716
Registry:
New Westminster
Between:
Alla Gonopolsky
Plaintiff
And
Dale Hammerston
Defendant
Before:
The Honourable Mr. Justice N. Brown
Reasons for Judgment
Counsel for the Plaintiff: | J. Woods |
Counsel for the Defendant: | J.S. Dyer |
Place and Date of Hearing: | New Westminster, B.C. October 23, 2015 |
Place and Date of Judgment: | New Westminster, B.C. November 3, 2015 |
[1]
The plaintiff has asked the Court to determine if the plaintiff had
sufficient reason to commence her personal injury action in the Supreme Court
of British Columbia, and thereby entitle her to costs of the action pursuant to
Rule 14-1(10) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009 and
to costs of the application. The defendant opposes the application.
[2]
The plaintiff claimed she suffered an injury in a motor vehicle accident
on January 14, 2011. The plaintiff was a passenger. On January 25, 2011, the
solicitors, Cowley & Company, were retained to represent her in her
personal injury claim.
[3]
On December 14, 2012, roughly two months before expiry of the limitation
period, the plaintiff filed a Notice of Civil Claim.
[4]
On June 1, 2011, the ICBC adjuster sent two letters to the solicitor;
one setting out the litigation position that the plaintiff’s action was statute
barred; the second that the low velocity in collision could not have caused the
plaintiff injury.
[5]
The plaintiff relied on two medical legal reports written by Dr. Sandeep
Sawhney: the first, on October 4, 2011; and the second, on June 8, 2012. Dr. Sawhney’s
second report confirmed the diagnosis he had already made in the first report.
He opined the plaintiff’s condition was chronic and likely to continue in
future.
[6]
On November 5, 2012, the ICBC adjuster confirmed its earlier position
that s. 10(1) of the Workers Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996,
c. 492 [WCA], barred the plaintiff from bringing a claim against
the defendant. This was the same day the plaintiff filed her Notice of Civil
Claim.
[7]
On October 7, 2014, a day before the trial was supposed to begin, the
parties settled the case for $22,500.
Legal Principles
[8]
Most of the cases the parties presented dealt with the outcome judgments
that fell below the $25,000 threshold. As just mentioned, In this case, the
parties settled the matter. They did not settle costs. The Rule applies to
judgments and settlements.
[9]
The applicable principles were summarized by the trial judge in Khan
v. All-Can Express Ltd., 2014 BCSC 2066, quoted in the Court of Appeal
decision 2015 BCCA 234, at paras. 9 and 10:
[9] In his costs reasons, the trial judge made
reference to the leading authorities in this Court on R. 14-1(10): Gehlen v.
Rana, 2011 BCCA 219 and Gradek v. DaimlerChrysler Financial Services
Canada Inc. and Fletcher, 2011 BCCA 136. He summarized the principles
arising from those authorities as follows:
[28] Based upon these
authorities, I conclude that the principles to be applied in the matter at bar
are these:
(a) where
a plaintiff in an action brought in the Supreme Court recovers a sum within the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 430 (that is $25,000 or less), that party is not
entitled to costs, other than disbursements, unless the trial court makes a
positive finding that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding
in the Supreme Court;
(b) the
point in time for a consideration of whether a plaintiff had sufficient reason
for bringing a proceeding in the Supreme Court is at the time the action is
initiated;
(c) the
meaning to be given to sufficient reason is not limited to the likely quantum
of the damages sought; while that is an important factor, other relevant
considerations may be taken into account;
(d) the
burden on the plaintiff to establish sufficient reason requires proof of
eligible circumstances that are persuasive and compelling: Gehlen, at para. 37;
and
(e) the
determination of whether sufficient reason has been made out is assessed on an
objective basis.
[29] The Court of Appeal in Gradek
examined and explained this third point relating to the meaning of sufficient
reason. The conclusion of the trial judge in that case was informed by a
number of considerations, including divergence in the authorities relating to
liability and the fact that Mr. Gradek was a Polish immigrant who had
difficulty expressing himself, was forgetful, and had fragmentary recollections
of events: (para. 12). For these reasons, the trial judge concluded that
it would have been extraordinarily difficult for the plaintiff to present the
case on his own.
[30] Finding that it was
implicit in the trial judges reasons that he considered that it would be
unjust to find Mr. Gradek required counsel to properly present his claim,
on the one hand, and to deny him costs which would partially off-set the
expense of retaining counsel, on the other, Madam Justice Prowse, writing for
the Court, said this at para. 20:
While I am satisfied that the
words, sufficient reason should not be interpreted in an expansive manner,
but with restraint, I am also satisfied that they must be read in such a way
that a trial judge is not forced to deny a party costs where he is satisfied,
as here, that justice can only be achieved as between the parties by an award
of costs to the successful party.
[10] The trial judge then went on to apply those
principles to the case before him. In that regard, he found:
[31] Applying those principles
to the matter at bar, I am unable to conclude that the plaintiff has satisfied
the onus of proving that, at the time the suit was commenced, he had sufficient
reason to bring the action in this Court. As noted, the test of sufficient
reason is objective and a finding of sufficient reason requires proof by the
plaintiff of persuasive and compelling circumstances. I note that the plaintiff
has elected to adduce no evidence by way of affidavit in the hearing. Nor,
following the submission he made respecting the jurisdictional argument, and
that having not disposed of the matter, did he seek to adjourn the hearing of
the substantive issue on the basis that he was not prepared to deal with it
then.
[32] In the present case,
there is no question that, being an allegation of wrongful dismissal, the claim
had some modest degree of complexity. The plaintiffs situation was complicated
to some extent because of the contract, which purported to characterize his
circumstance as an independent contractor. However, it is, in my view, quite
significant that the state of authorities as of the time his claim was
commenced was reasonably straightforward. A decision of this Court, Fasslane
Delivery Services Ltd. v. Purolator Courier Ltd., 2007 BCSC 1879, had dealt
with the issue in an authoritative and determinative way. The Fasslane
decision made reference to a body of authority which supported the conclusion
that persons such as the plaintiff were dependent contractors. It also
distinguished the only other British Columbia decision which held to the
contrary, Tajarobi v. Corporate Couriers Ltd., 2006 BCSC 454. In fact,
it was the Tajarobi decision that the defendant relied upon to defend
the claim.
[33] Accordingly, in my view,
while the case was not a simple one, the principal legal concept in question
was established and relatively straightforward. This is not a matter where it
can be said that the plaintiff was undertaking his case with no authority to
support his position or where there was a real conflict in the law.
[36] That being said, the determination of the cost
issue at this time requires this Court to decide whether the plaintiff has
proven that there were persuasive, compelling circumstances which constituted a
sufficient reason to bring his action in this Court. I find that threshold has
not been met.
[10]
Further, at para. 14 of that decision, the burden of proof rests
with the plaintiff:
[14] While an award of costs generally involves the
exercise of discretion, the determination as to whether there were sufficient
reasons to bring a proceeding in Supreme Court does not involve an exercise of
discretion. This was explained in Gradek at para. 16:
[16] The words
"sufficient reason" are not defined in the Rules of Court. In
their ordinary and grammatical sense, they do not suggest a specific limitation
in terms of application, although it is clear that "any reason" will
not do. The reason has to be "sufficient", but there is nothing in
the Rule to suggest that it has to be connected solely to the quantum of the
claim. On the other hand, the words do not connote the exercise of a
discretion, with its attendant deferential standard of review. That point was
made by this Court in Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, 72 B.C.L.R. (4th)
1, at para. 13:
[13] At the outset, I observe that the application of
Rule 57(10) does not involve an exercise of discretion. For a plaintiff who
recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court to recover
more than disbursements, the court must make a finding that there was sufficient
reason for bringing the action in the Supreme Court.
FACTS
[11]
The plaintiff does not have an ongoing obligation to assess what quantum
the plaintiff is likely to recover and in that light to decide whether the
claims should be transferred from the Supreme Court to the Small Claims
division of the Provincial Court: Gehlen v. Rana, 2011 BCCA 219, at para. 21
[Gehlen], citing Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448.
[12]
As noted by Justice Arnold-Bailey in Cairns v. Gill, 2011 BCSC
420, at para. 43, in some cases, it ought to have been evident from the
outset that the plaintiff should have brought [their] case in Provincial
Court. In that case, Arnold-Bailey J. found that she [could not] say there
was no basis for proceeding in Supreme Court and therefore no sufficient reason
to proceed in Supreme Court.
[13]
In a similar vein, Justice Truscott noted in Mak v. Eichel, 2009
BCSC 47 [Mak], at para. 23, "
[A]t the best of times I
consider it difficult for any plaintiff’s counsel to eliminate the appropriate
range involved for personal injury actions of his clients at the initiation of
the action. The medical conditions of many plaintiffs continue to change
following the initiation of the action as they continue to recover from their
injuries or continue to suffer. In that case, Justice Truscott noted the
treating physicians early optimistic report; an optimism supplanted by his
opinion about two years later, that the plaintiff
would continue to suffer
some degree of left shoulder pain probably for another one or two years" [para. 24].
[14]
At para. 25, Justice Truscott further noted:
[25] The award to the
plaintiff
of $20,000 is by itself less than the limit of jurisdiction in
small claims of $25,000, but is not less by any large amount, and with the
difficulty facing counsel of accurately estimating the range for a personal
injury for his client at the initiation of litigation, knowing that if action
is commenced in small claims his client will be limited to $25,000 no matter
that the assessment might be in excess of $25,000, I’m satisfied this plaintiff
did have sufficient reason for bringing her claim in Supreme Court.
[15]
Sanderson v. Van Humbeck, 2013 BCSC 1546 [Sanderson] also
involved settlement of a claim. Justice Voith noted the comments of Justice
Punnett in Spencer v. Popham, 2010 BCSC 683 [Spencer] at para. 16,
as follows:
[16] In Ostovic, [v. Foggin, 2009 BCSC 58]
another case arising out of a low impact accident, Justice Savage noted that
because the defendant denied liability, causation and special damages, the
plaintiff had to prove these issues in court. Because of this, the plaintiff
needed to avail himself of pre-trial discovery, which provided important
evidence of the speed of impact, the consequences of impact and concern over
the plaintiff’s condition. In addition, Justice Savage found at para. 42:
[42] There is the additional
factor that, as in Faedo and Kanani [v. Misiurna, 2008 BCSC
1274], the Plaintiff faced an institutional defendant which, in the ordinary
course, has counsel. To obtain any recovery the Plaintiff is forced to go to
court, where he is facing counsel and counsel is reasonably required, but in
Provincial Court there is no way of recovering the costs of counsel.
…
[24] Further, even if it was clear that the claim would
fall within the Small Claims Court’s jurisdiction, the issues raised by the
defendant increased the complexity of the claim and the plaintiff’s need for
counsel. By denying liability, causation and that the plaintiff suffered any
loss, the plaintiff would have been required to prove these elements at trial.
Also, although unnecessary because the matter settled, discovery of the
defendant, which had been arranged, could have been important to the
plaintiff’s case.
[25] In taking the position
that this was a low velocity impact claim the defendants created the situation
giving rise to this motion. Their pleadings raised a multitude of issues in
their defence. Those issues raised complex questions of fact and law. It is
unlikely that a lay person could address them competently. Therefore, I find
that there was sufficient reason for the plaintiff to bring the action in
Supreme Court regardless of the quantum at the time of commencement.
[16]
At para. 14, Justice Voith noted that such factors distinguished
his case from what was emphasized in Gehlen, at para. 32.
[17]
At para. 14, Justice Voith further noted:
[14] Although I am aware that I am not to use hindsight
in deciding what was reasonable, I do observe that this does not appear to be a
case where it was apparent from the outset that the plaintiff would fall below
the $25,000 threshold. Simply put, factors such as those that were emphasized
in the following passage from Gehlen at para. 32, including the
amount of damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle, were absent when the plaintiff
commenced this action in Supreme Court:
[32] The foregoing synopsis demonstrates that, at the
time the plaintiff commenced her action in the Supreme Court, she was aware
that the accident involved very minor impact and minimal damage to the vehicle.
She complained of soft tissue injuries, most of which had been symptomatic
before the accident. An objective assessment at the inception of the action
would indicate that the probable non-pecuniary damages for this plaintiff would
necessarily be modest. It would be clear to an objective observer that the
plaintiff’s alleged injuries were only a modest aggravation of the medical
issues for which she had sought treatment over the 15 years prior to the
accident.
REASONS FOR BRINGING ACTIONS IN SMALL
CLAIMS COURT
[18]
Dr. Sawhney noted in his October 4, 2011 report that the plaintiff
was 23 years old at the time of the accident. At para. 3(a), he described
the accident as follows:
a. It was around 10 AM., Alla and
her friend were driving on 7th Avenue in Vancouver. Ms. Gonopolsky
was wearing a seatbelt and was sitting in the front passenger seat of her
friend’s minivan. As they approached the intersection of 7th Ave and Manitoba
Street their minivan collided with another vehicle which had driven through a
STOP sign without stopping. The right front side of the minivan crashed into
the driver’s door of the other car.
[19]
The plaintiff attended the office for the first time on February 2,
2011. At that time she complained of a headache, low back pain that radiated
into her right leg, and difficulty falling asleep. She developed a fear of
riding in a car and had resorted to using public transportation instead. Dr. Kumar,
the examining physician at the time, noted mild tenderness in the right hip and
a pulling sensation in the posterior thigh muscles.
[20]
The plaintiff was seen again by Dr. Kumar on February 16, 2011,
when the plaintiff complained of low back pain radiating down into her right
leg and headaches, less severe than on the previous visit. She had been seeing
a chiropractor and a massage therapist twice weekly and attending counselling
for her driving anxiety. The plaintiffs complaints continued. She was seen
again by Dr. Kumar on February 23 and March 23, 2011.
[21]
On July 6, 2011, Dr. Sawhney saw the plaintiff. He noted she
continued to complain of recurrent headaches, although the severity had
improved. He noted her back pain had improved. He saw the plaintiff again, on
September 7, 2011. She was still symptomatic. He noted she was still fearful of
riding in cars and buses. Insomnia and nightmares had resolved. She followed an
exercise program to control her pain and alleviate her symptoms.
[22]
Dr. Sawhney noted the following complaints current as of October 4,
2011 when he wrote his report: lower back pain radiating to the right leg; neck
pain; headaches; and anxiety.
[23]
Dr. Sawhneys examination revealed tenderness in the lower back and
the right side; right-sided lower back tenderness on forward flexion;
right-sided neck tenderness on lateral flexion of the neck; and right sided
neck tenderness on neck rotation to the left side. The plaintiff denied any
symptoms like that before the accident.
[24]
Dr. Sawhneys diagnosis was as follows:
1. Ms. Alla
Gonopolsky has suffered a sprain/strain of her neck, back, and hip. This injury
involves micro-tearing of the muscles, tendons, and ligaments and is
collectively known as a "soft tissue injury.
2. The
patient also has injuries to her facet joints (small stabilizing joints located
between and behind adjacent vertebrae) in her neck and back. This can be characterized
as a "facet joint" injury.
3. Chronic pain
4. Anxiety disorder
The above diagnoses are
consistent with the mechanism of injury the patient was involved in.
[25]
With respect to effects of the injuries on employability Dr. Sawhney
opined as follows:
The motor vehicle accident caused
[the plaintiff] to develop anxiety and fear when she rides in a car. She no
longer wants to get a driver’s license and drive because of the accident and
this bothers her and her husband a lot. This will limit your employment
opportunities as she will not be able to drive and will have to depend on
public transportation to get around. [The plaintiff] will have to find a
suitable position which is walking distance away from her house or near public
transportation.
[26]
As for effects of the injuries on lifestyle he summarized as follows:
As per [the plaintiff] the motor
vehicle accident has affected her personal life. She states due to the chronic
pain she could not spend time with her niece. She could not speak to her
family, through the computer (via Skype), in Israel because of her recurrent
headaches. She had a difficult time sleeping and also experienced nightmares as
a result of the accident. She started to cry a lot and argued with her husband
more frequently than before the accident. This put a strain on the relationship
which led to her not wanting to have an intimate relationship with him. [The
plaintiff] states this problem with intimacy still exists with her husband.
[27]
With respect to effects of the injuries on household chores, Dr. Sawhney
reported that after the accident she was unable to do all types of housework
she used to do which included: cooking, cleaning, and shopping. The plaintiff
reported that her husband started to do all the shopping after work and her
mother-in-law would frequently come to clean and cook. However, as of the date
of his report, she was able to do most of her household chores, but not ones
requiring heavy-lifting or excessive physical labour.
[28]
With respect to prognosis, Dr. Sawhney stated:
[The plaintiff’s] symptoms have
improved, but she is not at her pre-accident status yet. She will need to
follow the treatment recommendations stated above [physio/chiropractic/massage
therapy and active rehabilitation, MRI of the lumbar sacral spine to rule out
disc herniation and nerve impingement, psychotherapy, prescription pain
medications. He continued as follows.] Unfortunately, at this point, it is more
likely than not that she will continue to live with some degree of pain
indefinitely even after all treatments are completed. As stated above, an MRI
will be required to fully gauge the extent of her back injury. If there is no
disc herniation, then it is more likely she will make a full recovery. However,
the longer her symptoms continue, the less likely she is to make a full
recovery and achieve accident status.
[29]
Although Dr. Sawhneys second report dated June 8, 2012, is of
marginal relevance, considering the principle that it is the evidence known at
the time the action is commenced that is most germane, it is noteworthy that
after the plaintiff’s attendances on April 27, 2012 and June 8, 2012, the
plaintiff still remained significantly symptomatic. On June 8, 2012, she still
complained of back pain on an intermittent basis, though no longer radiating
down her legs. Anxiety persisted. She was still afraid to drive. Her sleep had
improved and nightmares diminished. However, she had still not resumed heavy
chores at home. Tenderness and stiffness in her neck and upper back muscles
persisted, etc.
[30]
Dr. Sawhney opined that the plaintiff had injuries to her facet
joints in the neck and back. He noted that the MRI report of the lumbar spine
indicated mild to moderate facet osteoarthritis at multiple levels. He noted as
well, that the plaintiff had been experiencing chronic pain since the January
14, 2011 accident. He opined the accident rendered a previously asymptomatic
condition symptomatic. He opined that she currently had chronic, intermittent
back pain. The symptoms had improved, but had not returned yet to the
pre-status level. He stated "Unfortunately, at this point, it is more likely
than not that she will continue to live with some degree of back pain
indefinitely.
[31]
Dr. Sawhney further opined:
[The plaintiff’s] prognosis is
that she is likely to continue with chronic, intermittent pain for the
foreseeable future. She will not be able to do heavy housework or hard labor.
Therefore, this will limit her future employment opportunities. She will
continuously need the help of her husband to help with chores that require
heavy lifting or are intensive in nature. More sessions with a massage therapist
and with a physiotherapist or kinesiologist will help to minimize her pain.
Moreover, she will need to continue a home exercises program on a regular basis
to maximize her health. I do not believe she will make a full recovery to her
pre-accident status.
[32]
This information was not on the solicitors desk when the action
commenced, but it illustrates what can occur with soft tissue injuries and some
understandable need for caution when it comes to prognosis at the earlier
stages.
[33]
The defendant stressed Exhibit G in the affidavit of defence counsel’s
legal assistant, Ginger Andrews. The exhibit essentially exhibits excerpts from
the clinical records of Dr. Sawhney. Counsel highlighted, in particular,
the entry on March 23, 2011, which states:
Documentation Date: 06-Jul-2011
[06-Jul-2011.: ICBC Follow up]
Pt here for f/u
Pt still has HA, but better.
Back pain is better.
Pt completed physio.
Pt states she will be closing her case and will be meeting
with her lawyer today.
Not taking any meds right now for pain.
Back: No tenderness, FROM
Ext.: Strength 5/5 UT/LE b/l
A/P:
Back pain: resolved, naprosyn prn
HA: naprosyn prn [as needed]
RTC if any new c/o or not better.
[34]
The
defendant argued that, viewed reasonably, the entry suggests the plaintiff had
almost fully recovered from her injuries.by July 6, 2011. The defendant also
stressed that the entry "back pain: resolved, naprosyn prn contradicts
what Dr. Sawhney stated in his report dated October 4, 2011, about the
plaintiff’s injuries where he stated, "Her back pain had improved and no
tenderness was revealed on examination [on July 6, 2011].
[35]
I grant
this apparent contradiction could form grist for the mill on cross-examination,
but the case did not get there. It is also noteworthy that in common usage the
entry "back pain is better could mean either improved, or recovered.
These are clinical record entries and without the physicians explanation,
should be interpreted conservatively. Dr. Sawhneys reports, not his brief
clinical notes embody his medical legal opinion. As Justice Truscott observed
in Mak, the final course of soft tissue injuries can be difficult to
predict from the outset, which is why follow-up is sometimes necessary to reach
a reliable prognosis.
[36]
Considering the nature of the injuries, and the effects on homemaking
and employment, I find there was a substantial possibility the damages could
exceed $25,000.
[37]
Further, the plaintiff submits other sufficient reasons to commence
action in Supreme Court were the insurers denial of coverage because the
forces were insufficient to cause injury; and because the plaintiff was
allegedly a worker, which if proven and given the defendant was, would see the
action statute barred pursuant to s. 10(1) of the WCA.
[38]
Addressing
reasons for commencing action in Supreme Court, plaintiff’s counsel states in
her affidavit, sworn September 10, 2015, at paras. 8 and 9 as follows:
8. On November 5, 2012, I received
a phone call from [the ICBC adjuster who] confirmed to me at that time that
ICBC’s position was that [the plaintiff] was working at the time of the
Collision, and that they would require a WCAT determination on that issue.
9. On December 14, 2012, our
office filled the Notice of Civil Claim commencing this action. At the time of
filing, I was of the view that examinations for discovery would be necessary
because of ICBC’s position regarding worker-worker issue. Based on the
medical-legal reports of Dr. Sawhney, I was also of the view that there
was a real and substantial chance that [the plaintiff’s] claim was worth in
excess of $25,000.
[39]
As for the WCAT issue, the defendant argued it was not complicated and
could have been determined in Provincial Court. As for the basics on that
matter, I understand the plaintiff was working as a cleaner at the time. The
driver was on her way to work. The plaintiffs position was that she was going
to be dropped off downtown and that she was not on the way to work that day.
The defendant pointed out the plaintiff was not yet legally eligible to work in
Canada and, accordingly, argued the plaintiff could not recover a wage loss in
the first place, making WCAT issues moot. That could be argued at trial, had it
got there. As it was, the defendant never withdrew the defence before trial and
when the action was commenced, the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected
to know how that defence would play out.
[40]
The defendant’s position that the impacts velocity was too low to cause
an injury somewhat further complicated the case, would likely call for
examinations for discovery, and at some juncture might entail an engineers
opinion. It is unlikely the defendant would invest capital in that line of
defence for this case, but it is reasonable to say the plaintiffs burden on
causation would be somewhat heavier than in a case where the force of the
accident is not really in issue, which weigh in favour of a trial in this
court.
[41]
Ultimately, the $22,500 settled figure compensated only non-pecuniary
damages.
[42]
As similarly noted in Spencer at para. 24, the defendants positions
effectively increased the complexity of the claim and the plaintiff’s need for
counsel. By denying liability, causation and that the plaintiff suffered any
loss, the plaintiff would have been required to prove these elements at trial.
Further, at para. 25, In taking the position that this was a low velocity
impact claim the defendants created the situation giving rise to this motion.
Their pleadings raised a multitude of issues in their defence. Those issues
raised complex questions of fact and law. It is unlikely that a layperson could
address them competently. WCAT issues are sometimes simple. But for the
plaintiff, it raised questions of mixed fact and law that raised another
redoubt the plaintiff had to overcome.
[43]
The gap between the $25,000 threshold for small claims actions and the
$22,500 settled on for non-pecuniary damages is not very wide, unlike the large
gaps seen in some cases. A host of factors influence a settlement, but the
amount settled here is at least within shouting distance of $25,000. Although
that somewhat suggests the initial decision to bring action in the Supreme
Court was reasonably defensible, standing alone, that is not sufficient reason.
[44]
In summary, the plaintiff has met the burden of proof required, albeit
not by a large margin, but I am satisfied on balance that considering the
potential damages that could be awarded for the plaintiff’s claim and the
complications raised by the minimal damage and worker-worker defence, the
plaintiff had sufficient reason to bring the action in the Supreme Court of
British Columbia.
[45]
The plaintiff is entitled to costs of the action and of the application
at Scale B.
N.
Brown J.