IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Date: 20151013

Docket: M147697

Registry:
Vancouver

Between:

Amarjit Singh Mann

Plaintiff

And

Ryan Elphick and
Sunny Lee-Anne Elphick

Defendants

Before:
The Honourable Madam Justice Maisonville

Reasons for Judgment

introduction

[1]            
The plaintiff, Amarjit Singh Mann brings an application that he be granted leave to use certain
documents revealed during the course of this litigation which have an implied
undertaking that these documents not be used except for the purposes of this
litigation. 

[2]            
Mr. Mann had been in a motor vehicle accident. 
He had started an action and was, as well, receiving disability benefits from
his insurer, Great-West Life Assurance Company (“GWL”).  A settlement offer had
been made by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (“ICBC”) on behalf
of the defendants.  Suddenly, his disability benefits ceased and the settlement
offer was withdrawn.

[3]            
Mr. Mann sought production of his claim file from
the application respondent, GWL.  This file was produced to him in a redacted
form so as not to disclose the identity of an anonymous third party who had
sent certain information to GWL.

[4]            
A complaint was filed with the Office of the
Information Commissioner for British Columbia (“OIPC”) to obtain unredacted
copies of those documents.  The OIPC confirmed the redactions as an unredacted
version of the documents would tend to disclose the third party.

[5]            
An order was then granted by Justice Burnyeat on
July 31, 2015 that GWL produce to counsel for the plaintiff a copy of their
unredacted file pertaining to the plaintiff which contains certain information
and documentation GWL had received from an anonymous third party, and which GWL
had in turn disclosed to the ICBC (the “GWL documents”).  The implied
undertaking attaches to these documents.

[6]            
The plaintiff seeks leave to use the information
for three reasons:

i)      
to commence an action in the British Columbia
Supreme Courts against Karminder Badyal and two unknown persons for defamation;

ii)    
to disclose to Pfirst Pharma Inc., Candrug Pharmacy
Inc., Annacis Capital Corp., and BMG Merchant Services Inc.;

iii)    for use in the mediation arbitration proceedings (“med/arb
proceedings”) involving the plaintiff and his two partners, Sukhwinder Grewal and
Navtej Bains, which is presently proceeding before the Honourable Wallace T. Oppal,
Q.C.

Background

[7]            
The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle
accident and is seeking damages from the defendants, Ryan Elphick and Sunny Lee-Anne
Elphick in this action.

[8]            
On April 3, 2014, an anonymous person using
the name “John Alein” emailed an adjuster at GWL in which he claimed to know
the plaintiff very well and provided to the adjuster the plaintiff’s address,
social insurance number, date of birth, and passport number.  The allegations were
that the plaintiff was a fraud and was defrauding GWL and ICBC. 

[9]            
GWL is Mr. Mann’s insurer and Mr. Mann
has made a claim for disability benefits from his insurer following the motor
vehicle accident.  Upon request by the plaintiff, GWL provided redacted copies
of certain documents.  The plaintiff claims this email is defamatory.

[10]        
The allegations made to GWL also claimed that a company
called Candrug Pharmacy Inc. paid the plaintiff a monthly management fee of $15,000
through Mr. Mann’s company, ASM Bio-ventures, and that Mr. Mann
subsequently diverted his salary from a company called Calibro to his wife so
that he could make a claim for loss of income.

[11]        
A second email which the plaintiff claims is
defamatory was received by the adjuster at GWL on April 8, 2014, again purporting
to be from Mr. Alein.  He claimed to be someone close to the plaintiff and
stated that the plaintiff was no longer able to work as a pharmacist, not
because of the motor vehicle accident, but rather due to a knee injury that he
had sustained while playing soccer, and that the disability insurance policy
was Mr. Mann’s retirement plan and this pre-existing injury had been hidden by Mr. Mann
from GWL by providing incomplete medical records with the assistance of his
best friend Dr. Singh.

[12]        
The third matter that the plaintiff claims to be
defamatory is that on June 23, 2014, someone who provided the name “Carm Badyal”
with a phone number given to GWL, telephoned Paul Jones, a senior investigator
with GWL, in which she indicated that the plaintiff had terminated her
employment because she was pregnant.  “Carm” also said that she had emails
provided by Mr. Mann which detailed communications he had with the
physiotherapist and that that physiotherapist had told the plaintiff what to
put on the claim forms in order to ensure a claim.

[13]        
The plaintiff is claiming this is defamatory because
of subsequent email the investigator Paul Jones sent to Shannon Buoncore, a
senior claims specialist at GWL on June 23, 2014 in respect of the phone
call he received from “Carm Badyal” respecting the plaintiff.  In that email,
Mr. Jones provided to Ms. Buoncore a synopsis of the phone call he
received which included that “she said she has e-mails which she has obtained
from a “partner” of the company”.

[14]        
Apparently, this “partner” has supplied “Carm”
with the e-mails which she says contain details communication between the Physio
and Mann in which the Physio advises Mann what to put on the claim forms in
respect of his health issues.  It appears that “Carm” knows Mann.  According to
“Carm”, Mann uses the gym and lifts weights. 

[15]        
Karminder Badyal is in fact a former employee of
Pfirst Pharma Inc.  She was terminated in September 2013, and on September 11,
2013, she entered into an confidentiality agreement with Pfirst Pharma Inc. in
which she indicated that she would not at any time, directly or indirectly, by
any means whatsoever, divulge, furnish, provide access to, or use for any
purpose any confidential information she obtained in the course of her
employment with Pfirst Pharma Inc. or its related companies, Candrug Pharmacy
at Inc., Annacis Capital Corp. and BMG Merchant services Inc.

[16]        
The plaintiff here was aware that something was
amiss as an earlier offer of settlement had been removed on June 20, 2014.  Ms.
Buoncore had in fact spoken to ICBC earlier and on June 20, 2014 had forwarded
the emails to its adjuster, Nancy Goodman.

[17]        
In summary, the plaintiff claims:

·      
that the GWL documents clearly set out that “John
Alein” defamed the plaintiff in the two emails purportedly authored by him;

·      
that Karminder Badyal defamed the plaintiff in
the phone call;

·      
that Karminder Baydal also breached the
confidentiality agreement with Pfirst Pharma Inc and its related companies; and

·      
that one of the plaintiff’s business partners
wrongfully provided confidential information to “John Alein” or Ms. Badyal
or both.

[18]        
The plaintiff also claims that the information
from John Alein or Ms. Badyal or both of them could be from one of the
business partners who wrongfully provided confidential information to either “John
Alein or Ms. Badyal or both” and in so doing, committed:

i)      
the tort of breach of confidence;

ii)    
breach of fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff;

iii)    the statutory tort created by the Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996,
c. 73.

[19]        
These documents as noted were provided in a
redacted form during the discovery process.  Accordingly, except for under limited
circumstances, documentary and oral information obtained on discovery cannot be
used by the other parties except for the purposes of the litigation, unless or
until the scope of the undertaking is varied by a court order – there is an
implied undertaking: see Juman v. Doucette, 2008 SCC 8 at para. 4:

[4] Thus the rule is that both documentary and oral information obtained on
discovery, including information thought by one of the parties to disclose some
sort of criminal conduct, is subject to the implied undertaking. It is
not to be used by the other parties except for the purpose of that
litigation, unless and until the scope of the undertaking is varied by a court
order or other judicial order or a situation of immediate and serious danger
emerges.

[20]        
Juman sets out
the public interest in maintaining the implied undertaking: see paras. 24 and
25:

[24]      In the first place, pre-trial
discovery is an invasion of a private right to be left alone with your thoughts
and papers, however embarrassing, defamatory or scandalous.  At least one
side in every lawsuit is a reluctant participant.  Yet a proper pre-trial
discovery is essential to prevent surprise or “litigation by ambush”, to
encourage settlement once the facts are known, and to narrow issues even where
settlement proves unachievable.  Thus, rule 27(22) of the B.C. Rules of
Court compels a litigant to answer all relevant questions posed on an
examination for discovery.  Failure to do so can result in punishment by
way of imprisonment or fine pursuant to rules 56(1), 56(4) and 2(5).  In
some provinces, the rules of practice provide that individuals who are not even
parties can be ordered to submit to examination for discovery on issues
relevant to a dispute in which they may have no direct interest.  It is
not uncommon for plaintiff’s counsel aggressively to “sue everyone in sight”
not with any realistic hope of recovery but to “get discovery”.  Thus, for
the out-of-pocket cost of issuing a statement of claim or other process, the
gate is swung open to investigate the private information and perhaps highly
confidential documents of the examinee in pursuit of allegations that might in
the end be found to be without any merit at all. 

[25]      The
public interest in getting at the truth in a civil action outweighs the
examinee’s privacy interest, but the latter is nevertheless entitled to a
measure of protection.  The answers and documents are compelled by statute
solely for the purpose of the civil action and the law thus requires that the
invasion of privacy should generally be limited to the level of disclosure
necessary to satisfy that purpose and that purpose alone.  Although the
present case involves the issue of self-incrimination of the appellant, that
element is not a necessary requirement for protection.  Indeed, the
disclosed information need not even satisfy the legal requirements of
confidentiality set out in Slavutych v. Baker, [1976] 1 S.C.R.
254.  The general idea, metaphorically speaking, is that whatever is
disclosed in the discovery room stays in the discovery room unless eventually
revealed in the courtroom or disclosed by judicial order.

Accordingly, a judicial order must be
obtained to reveal that which is learned and obtained through the discovery
process.

[21]        
Additionally, in Juman, the Supreme Court
of Canada set out that a litigant must have some assurance that answers and
documents used on the discovery will not be used for collateral purpose.  This
will achieve the goal of a more candid discovery.  It is only if the interests
of justice and disclosure outweigh the potential prejudice that would result to
the party disclosing the evidence that the court may order that the implied
undertaking not to apply.  This may be on such terms as are just.

[22]        
The onus is on the applicant to satisfy the
court on a balance of probabilities that the interest to be advanced through
the sought-after disclosure is greater than the values that underpin the
rationale for the implied undertaking.  The material must also be relevant to
the issues in action in which the disclosure sought: see British Columbia v.
Tekavec, 2012 BCSC 1348 at para. 13.

[23]        
At para. 14 of Tekavec, Mr. Justice
Williams states:

[14] In Juman, at paragraph 34, the Court set out the
applicable test, the test that has been formulated in those Canadian
jurisdictions which have enacted rules governing applications to alleviate the
restrictions of the implied undertaking and which generally reflects the common
law position:

If satisfied that the interest of justice outweighs any
prejudice that would result to a party who disclosed evidence, the court may
order that [the implied or “deemed” undertaking] does not apply to the evidence
or to information obtained from it, and may impose such terms and give such
directions as are just.

[24]        
At para. 17 Williams J. summarizes that:

[17] the
test will require that the applicant demonstrate that the evidence is relevant
and that any prejudice to be suffered by the examinee is clearly outweighed by
the legitimate interest in disclosure.

discussion

Issues of
prejudice

Prejudice to the
plaintiff

[25]        
The court will consider if there will be significant
prejudice to the plaintiff were there be a failure to lift an implied
undertaking, and whether that would cause the preemption of a legitimate tort
claim: see Southpaw Credit Opportunity Master Fund LP v. Asian Coast Development
(Canada) Ltd., 2012 BCSC 14 at paras. 17 and 20:

[17] Southpaw submits that the Tort Claim is one in which the
parties are the same and there is substantial overlap in the issues. The
proceedings can be said to be related. Southpaw argues that the balancing of
prejudice favors the petitioners in that there is much greater prejudice to
them in pre-empting a meritorious claim than there is in requiring Harbinger to
defend the claim on the merits.

[20] The proposed Tort Claim
arises from the same transactions occurring between the same parties. I agree
with the submission of Southpaw that there is substantial overlap and that the
proceedings are related. Apart from a concern with respect to procedure, ACDL
has identified no prejudice that it would suffer if Southpaw is given leave to
use its documents as proposed. In my view, there is no strong policy interest
against the proposed use of the documents and the balancing of prejudice favors
granting Southpaw leave to use the documents as proposed.

[26]        
The plaintiff submits that the GWL documents are
highly relevant as they relate to the plaintiff’s claim in respect of damages
for tortious conduct. The plaintiff also wishes to show that his personal
information has been wrongfully used by a person close to him.  They are
relevant to the med/arb proceedings because that proceedings concerns misuse of
confidential documents relating to the plaintiff by his business partner.  They
are also relevant to the Pfirst Pharma Inc., Candrug Pharmacy Inc., Annacis Capital
Corp., and BMG Merchant Services Inc. because the GWL documents would allow those
companies to determine whether Karminder Baydal has complied with her
confidentiality obligations in her contract that was entered into upon her
termination from Pfirst Pharma Inc.

[27]        
Furthermore, in respect of prejudice, the
plaintiff submits that if he is not allowed to use the GWL documents, his claims
which he submits have merit, will be preempted.  The plaintiff further submits that
he will not be able to obtain an order that his confidential papers be returned
to him and he will be at risk if the proposed defendants continue to defame him
and misuse his confidential papers in the future.

Prejudice to GWL

[28]        
The plaintiff submits that if the plaintiff is
permitted to use the GWL documents, prejudice to GWL is minimal because there
is no suggestion that the plaintiff will obtain a tactical advantage in this
action with respect to GWL and GWL has a reduced privacy interest in the GWL documents
because those documents must be provided to the plaintiff in any event in
accordance with s. 24 of the Personal Information Protection Act,
S.B.C. 2000, c. 63 (“PIPA”), which states:

24  (1) An
individual may request an organization to correct an error or omission in the
personal information that is

(a) about the
individual, and

(b) under the
control of the organization.

(2) If an organization is satisfied on
reasonable grounds that a request made under subsection (1) should be
implemented, the organization must

(a) correct the
personal information as soon as reasonably possible, and

(b) send the
corrected personal information to each organization to which the personal
information was disclosed by the organization during the year before the date
the correction was made.

(3) If no correction is made under
subsection (2), the organization must annotate the personal information under
its control with the correction that was requested but not made.

(4) When an
organization is notified under subsection (2) of a correction of personal
information, the organization must correct the personal information under its
control.

[29]        
GWL received this information in an unsolicited
fashion and did not agree to maintain the confidentiality of the information or
to preserve the anonymity of the persons who provided that information.

[30]        
It is important to note that there is a
confidentiality agreement in the med/arb proceedings.  That confidentiality
agreement in those proceedings as well will prevent the GWL documents from
being distributed any further.

[31]        
The plaintiff could bring a defamation action
against GWL directly and if the plaintiff were to do so, then GWL will be
obliged to disclose the GWL documents in that defamation action.  The plaintiff
could then take steps to add Mr. Alein, Ms. Badyal and the partner
who was being an anonymous person as defendants in that action.

[32]        
It is submitted on behalf of the plaintiff,
however, that this would be an inefficient and expensive process, wasting the court’s
time leading to essentially the same action proceedings that the plaintiff now seeks
leave to use the documents for.

[33]        
As an aside I note that there was an issue respecting
the lack of service on Ms. Badyal.  Ordinarily, by Rule 22-7 an
application must be served on every person who may be affected by the order. 
However, in Bodnar v. Cash Store Inc., 2010 BCSC 660 at para. 50,
Justice Griffin noted it is clear that the only party with an interest in the
implied undertaking of the documents at issue is the court itself:

[50] The
Cash Store has a preliminary objection. It argues that the plaintiffs have
failed to give notice to all parties who might be affected by the application.
In this regard, the Cash Store refers to some parties who may be affected in
the Tschritter Action if the plaintiffs are released from their
undertaking and the documents are used in the Alberta proceeding. I do not
consider this a valid objection. The only parties with an interest in the
implied undertaking in this case are the parties who produced the documents at
issue and the court itself. This is because the undertaking is an undertaking
to the court, based on policies that serve to promote full discovery by the
parties to the action. The party that produced the documents on discovery, the
court, and the party seeking leave are the interested parties. These are the
parties present on this application.

See also
paras. 21 and 22:

[21]      A party to a civil proceeding is under compulsion
to produce information in order to comply with discovery rules. The implied
undertaking of confidentiality provides some protection of privacy by assuring
the litigant that the information will not be used for a collateral purpose
outside the litigation. This encourages the litigant to live up to his or her
wide discovery obligations and so indirectly aids in getting at the truth in a
civil action.

[22]      For this reason, the
undertaking is an undertaking to the court. In return for the benefit of the
use of the court’s process to obtain information on discovery, the party who
receives the information gives a binding undertaking not to use the information
for any purpose other than the civil litigation in which it is produced. The
seriousness of the undertaking is underscored by the fact that breach of it can
give rise to the striking of a party’s claim or contempt proceedings: Juman,
at para. 29.

[34]        
GWL takes no position on this application.  However,
it is pointed out that Mr. Mann seeks to be relieved from the implied
undertaking of confidentiality, but in so doing, has disclosed unredacted
copies of the documents in this application, thereby breaching the implied
undertaking confidentiality.

[35]        
Justice Griffin noted this situation in Bodnar
at para. 41:

[41]      Requiring leave for
relief from the implied undertaking to use materials filed in court on an
interim application will not restrict the openness of the court. The public
will have access to the documents in the court file regardless of the fact that
a litigant may be precluded from using them outside the litigation. Public
access to documents in the court file will remain the rule. Public access to
the court file is subject only to a litigant applying for and meeting the
onerous test for sealing the court file from the public: Orr v. Sojitz
Tungsten Resources Inc., 2009 BCSC
1635; Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC
41, [2002] 2
S.C.R. 522.

[36]        
Orr was a case in
which Justice Kelleher was considering commercial interests but it was noted
that any such application engages the open court principle and Charter
values of freedom of expression.

[37]        
I had been asked to outline a procedure for
bringing these applications for relief of an implied undertaking.  It is
important to note that the application before me was brought in the context of
a busy chambers list and counsel had not put their mind to a procedure. 

[38]        
I find that one suggested course of action could
be for the party seeking to be relieved of the implied undertaking to seek an
order sealing the affidavit materials containing the documents to which the
implied undertaking attaches.  At that application, notice should be given to
all persons who would be effected by the order and argument could be made at
that time, balancing the interests at play.  Following that ruling, the party
would then bring the application to be relieved from the implied undertaking.

Whether the plaintiff should be relieved from his implied undertaking?

[39]        
In Ochitwa v. Bomnino, [1997] A.J. No. 1157(A.B.Q.B.),
Justice Coutu for the court quoted with approval at para. 20 from the Carbone
v. De La Rocha (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 355 case in which the court noted that
the implied undertaking rules was still being developed.

[40]        
Ochitwa also
referred to the decision of now Chief Justice MacLachlan at Kyuquot Logging
Ltd. v. British Columbia Forest Products Ltd., (1986) 5 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1
(C.A.), where the court held that the party obtaining discovery could use the
documents in similar litigation.  However, in Hunt v. and Atlas Turner Inc.,
[1995] 5 W.W.R. 518 (B.C.C.A.), the BC Court of Appeal overruled Kyuquot
Logging Ltd., holding that the party obtaining discovery of documents must
first obtain the court’s leave to use the documents other than in the
proceeding for which they were produced.

[41]        
Further in Ochitwa, paras. 23 and 24,
Coutu J. held:

[23]      Hunt v. T & N plc [1995] 5
W.W.R. 518 the B.C. (C.A.) held that there was an implied
undertaking rule in B.C., overruling its previous decision in Kyuguot Logging
v. B.C. Forest Products Ltd. In Hunt the court held that the party obtaining
discovery of documents must obtain the court’s leave to use the documents other
than in the proceedings in which they were produced.

[24]      When the B.C. Court of Appeal in the Kyuquot
decision held that there was no implied undertaking it commented under what
circumstance a court would grant an order limiting the use of discovery. At
page 505 Justice McLachlin stated:

“(3) The onus is on the person seeking to limit the use of
discovery to apply to court for an order so stating or to obtain an undertaking
to the same effect from the person to whom the discovery is made. This applies
both to oral and documentary discovery. Such an order might be justified by a
wide variety of circumstances, including avoidance of publication of trade
secrets or sensitive personal information and protection of the public’s
interest in a fair trial. In each case, the judge must balance the factors
favouring disclosure against those favouring keeping the discovery in question
confidential. The order should be tailored to achieve the fairest balance
between the competing interests in the particular circumstances of the case.
An order will generally not be granted in the following cases: (1) to
prevent the use of discovery in related actions; (2) cases where the public
interest requires disclosure; (3) cases where the information discloses
wrong-doing in the nature of fraud.” [Emphasis added]

[42]        
Ultimately, the court held in Ochitwa at para. 34
that it was within the court’s inherent jurisdiction of controlling its own
practices that it could order that an implied undertaking with respect to a
document or other evidence be removed in whole or in part: see also Ed Miller
Sales and Rentals Ltd. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., (1986), 43 Alta.
L.R. (2d) 299.

[43]        
In Ochitwa, the court granted relief to
the plaintiff for the following reasons set out in para. 45:

[45]      I grant relief to the Plaintiff from the
implied undertaking for the following reasons:

1.         In this case, the
Bombino’s are third parties and one of the policy reasons for the implied
undertaking rule, i.e. the rule against self-incrimination, would not be
applicable to the Bombino’s. This is not to say that there should be a rigid
rule that the implied undertaking rule is not applicable to third parties.
Rather, it is a consideration which I take into account in deciding
whether relief should be granted from the implied undertaking rule.

2.         The proceedings against
the Bombino’s are connected with the proceedings in which the disclosure was
made. The proceedings involve similar parties and issues. The Plaintiff could
have sued Alberta Blue Cross for wrongful dismissal and the Bombinos for
defamation in the same action if the identity of the Bombino’s was known
earlier. Alternatively, if the Plaintiff had not settled with Blue Cross the
Plaintiff could have applied to add the Bombino’s into the action once their
identity was known, as was done in the B.E. Chandler Co. Ltd. case. The fact
that Blue Cross chose not to disclose who had lodged the complaint without
court compulsion should not prevent the Plaintiff from seeking justice.

3.         The Court should grant
relief from the undertaking on the basis of the test that it should tolerate
some injustice to the discovered party if it is outweighed by a greater
injustice to the discovering party if she cannot make use of the discovered
documents. B.E. Chandler Co. Ltd., supra. In this case because Alberta Blue
Cross has already settled its action it cannot show substantial prejudice. On
the other hand, if the Plaintiff cannot use the documents, she suffers the
deprivation of being unable to advance a case which may (or may not) have
merit.

4.         The public interest
favors disclosure as the Defendants, if they have defamed the Plaintiff, should
not be permitted to hide their defamation behind the protection of the implied
undertaking rule. A rule set up to protect the administration of justice should
not be permitted to be used to subvert the ends of justice and prevent those
defamed from seeking justice.

5.         The Plaintiff did not ‘discover’
a cause of action from documents produced. The Plaintiff was aware a complaint
was made and that documents existed as the Plaintiff’s dismissal letter and the
Defendants’ defence raised this information. The Plaintiff only discovered the
name of the complainant through the discovery process.

6.         Confidentiality of the
identity of Blue Cross informants is not mandated by any public interest.
G.(P.I.) v. Brandt B.C. Supreme Court May 27, 1994, 25
C.P.C. (3d) page 383.

7.         The Plaintiff could have obtained the information
by other means. The Plaintiff alleges that the information was not published
solely to Alberta Blue Cross but was discussed with Mr. Brauner, an
acquaintance of the Bombinos and the co-defendant and perhaps other neighbours.

[44]        
In the case at bar, similarly, the proceedings
are connected in the manner in which the disclosure was made.  Additionally, that
the court should tolerate some injustice to the discovered party if it is
outweighed by a greater injustice to the discovering party who would be unable
to use the documents and here, the plaintiff would be deprived and unable to
advance a case, which may or may not have merit.  As in Ochitwa, there
is the issue of defamation and the public interest would favour disclosure as
the defamer should not be permitted to hide behind the protection of an implied
undertaking rule.  Confidentiality here is not mandated by any public
interest.  As noted earlier, the documents could have been obtained by other
means.

[45]        
I find in the circumstances of this case,
given the potential of prejudice to the plaintiff, that he should be relieved
from his implied undertaking in respect of the documents that were given unsolicited
to GWL. 

[46]        
The plaintiff, accordingly, is granted leave to
use the GWL documents for the three reasons as outlined earlier:

i)      
to commence an action in the British Columbia
Supreme Courts against Karminder Badyal and two unknown persons;

ii)    
to disclose the information to Pfirst Pharma
Inc., Candrug Pharmacy Inc., Annacis Capital Corp., and BMG Merchant Services
Inc.;

iii)    for use in the mediation arbitration proceedings involving the plaintiff
and his two partners, Sukhwinder Grewal and Navtej Bains, which is presently
proceeding before the Honourable Wallace T. Oppal, Q.C.

“Maisonville J.”