IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Date: 20141001

Docket: M125776

Registry:
Vancouver

Between:

Sabita Suedat

Plaintiff

And

Karim J. Kara

Defendant

Before:
The Honourable Mr. Justice G.P. Weatherill

Reasons for Judgment

I.                
Introduction

[1]            
The plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries sustained in a pedestrian/motor
vehicle collision that occurred on December 7, 2010 at the intersection of
Canada Way and Smith Avenue in Burnaby, BC. The plaintiff was crossing Canada
Way in the crosswalk when she was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant
(“Accident”).

[2]            
The plaintiff’s life has been replete with challenges starting from when
she was sexually assaulted as a young girl and later placed in a number of foster
homes. She bore two children from what were ultimately unsuccessful relationships.
Her youngest child, Brittany, has Rhett’s Syndrome and has struggled to survive
her entire 19 year old life. Brittany requires 24 hour a day care. The
plaintiff is her primary caregiver.

[3]            
In 2008 the plaintiff moved to British Columbia from Ontario because it
was a healthier climate for Brittany and because she hoped to be able to start
a new life including establishing a business as a wellness instructor and life
skills coach.

[4]            
The plaintiff claims general damages, special damages, past wage loss,
future wage loss, future care costs and loss of housekeeping capacity.

[5]            
Although the plaintiff was struck while she was in a crosswalk,
liability for the collision is an issue.

II.              
The issues

[6]            
The issues for determination are:

1.     Who
is liable for the December 7, 2010 Accident between the plaintiff and the
defendant’s vehicle?

2.     If
the defendant is liable, what should the plaintiff be awarded for general
damages, special damages, past wage loss, future wage loss and future care
costs?

III.            
Liability for the December 7, 2010 Accident

[7]            
The Accident occurred at approximately 6:45 p.m. on December 7, 2014.
The plaintiff had left her home and was walking down Smith Avenue towards
Canada Way. She was planning on catching a bus at the bus stop on the southwest
corner of that intersection. It was dark and it was drizzling out. The
plaintiff had a black umbrella in her hand and was wearing dark clothing.

[8]            
The plaintiff testified that she arrived at the northwest corner of the
intersection and she pushed the pedestrian walk button. She waited for the
lights to change and the walk signal to engage before stepping into the
intersection. Her evidence was that she took 2 ½ steps into the crosswalk and
that is her last memory before waking up on Canada Way some distance west of
the crosswalk. She marked the location of where she landed on the aerial
photograph of the intersection (Exhibit 3A). By my estimate, it was some 10 –
12 car lengths from the crosswalk.

[9]            
She woke up on the road surface. She was disoriented. She says she let
out five primal screams from deep within her. She got up and walked to the curb
and called 911. A man came to her assistance. She recalls that the ambulance
came first and then the RCMP. She recalls shaking badly. Her right ankle hurt
and she was having trouble weight bearing. Her pelvis hurt. She asked the
ambulance attendant to pace her breathing because she felt she was breathing out
of sync. She recalls having a brief conversation with an RCMP officer. She felt
the officer was racially profiling her. She recalls being taken to Burnaby
General Hospital where she stayed for 3 ½ hours. She says she was ignored most
of the time. Her stay at the hospital was unpleasant. She was placed in a back
room. She feels she was not taken seriously by the hospital staff. In order to
get their attention, she started screaming loudly.

[10]        
The defendant testified. He is 71 years of age and semi-retired. He had
just dropped his wife off a few blocks away and was driving to the Superstore
on Grandview Highway. He was travelling northbound on Smith Avenue intending on
turning left onto Canada Way. As he approached the intersection the light was
green in his direction. He signalled his intention to turn left approximately
half a block from the intersection. He slowed down and drove into the
intersection at approximately 10 km/h. He turned left into the left most
westbound lane of Canada Way. He saw the plaintiff to his right running with an
open umbrella in her hand. He hit the brakes and estimates he was able to
reduce his speed to approximately 5 km/h when his vehicle struck the plaintiff.
The impact occurred on the left front of his car. On impact, the plaintiff fell
on her right side onto the pavement. His evidence was that she remained on the
ground for approximately a minute (I am not satisfied it was indeed a minute,
but rather the defendant’s estimate of one minute was due to his poor estimate
of time —  I suspect it was much shorter). She then she got up quickly and walked
back to the sidewalk on the northwest corner of the intersection. He pulled his
vehicle into the curb of Canada Way and waited for the emergency personnel to arrive.

[11]        
When the investigation was complete, the defendant carried on with his
trip to the Superstore. There was no evidence of whether his vehicle was
damaged to any degree and he was not asked how far away the plaintiff was when
she got up. The defendant was unable to recall precisely where his vehicle was
when he first saw the plaintiff but he does recall seeing her running across
his path.

[12]        
He testified that after the plaintiff got up from the street, she appeared
to be very upset. She spoke loudly but she was not screaming. He went to her assistance
but she told him that she hated him and refused his help. He recalled her
making a phone call. He observed her limping as she walked.

[13]        
For the most part, I accept the defendant’s version of how the Accident
occurred over that of the plaintiff. I accept that the defendant was travelling
relatively slowly in making his left hand turn although I don’t accept his
evidence of his speed as being anything more than a guess.

[14]        
Section 127(1)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.
318 provides that the driver of a vehicle facing a green light:

(ii)        must yield the right
of way to a pedestrian lawfully in the intersection or in an adjacent crosswalk
at the time the green light is exhibited

[15]        
On the evidence, and contrary to the plaintiff’s evidence that she took
two and a half steps from the safety of the sidewalk into the marked crosswalk before
she was struck, I find the plaintiff had made a substantial entry into the
crosswalk and had nearly crossed two lanes of the westbound Canada Way at the
time of impact. Had the defendant maintained a proper lookout, it is likely
that he would have been able to stop in time to allow the plaintiff to pass
safely in front of him. He did not provide the court with any explanation for
his failure to see the plaintiff in the crosswalk (Petijevich v. Law,
[1969] S.C.R. 257).

[16]        
Once a pedestrian has safely entered a crosswalk, absent any negligence
on the pedestrian’s part that could mislead a motorist into thinking he or she
could proceed safely, the pedestrian may assume that motorists will yield the
right of way to them and will share no responsibility if struck in the
crosswalk (Miksch v. Hambleton, [1990] B.C.J. No. 1810 (S.C.)).

[17]        
Negligence on the part of a pedestrian in a crosswalk must be proven by
the defendant on the balance of probabilities. In Feng v. Graham (1988),
25 B.C.L.R. (2d) 116 (C.A.), Wallace J.A. stated at page 120:

In my view the plaintiff in the circumstances of this case
was entitled to assume that the defendant was going to obey the law and yield
the right-of-way to her. Her right to rely on that assumption continued until
such time as she knew, or ought to have known, that the defendant was not going
to grant her the right-of-way, whereupon the plaintiff’s obligation to avoid
injury to herself superseded her right to exercise her right-of-way. The
onus is on the defendants to establish that the plaintiff knew or ought to have
known, that the defendant driver was not going to grant her the right-of-way,
and that, at that point of time, the plaintiff could reasonably have avoided
the accident.

[Emphasis added.]

[18]        
Pedestrians in crosswalks are not required to exercise “extreme
vigilance” to ensure they won’t be struck (Jung v. Krimmer (1990), 47
B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 (C.A.), leave to appeal ref’d 135 N.R. 201n (S.C.C.)). To prove
contributory negligence on the part of a pedestrian, the defendant must show
more than inattention. A defendant must also establish (1) at what distance the
pedestrian should have realized from the speed of the approaching vehicle it
was not going to yield; (2) it would it have been possible for a pedestrian to
avoid being impacted; and (3) that a reasonable person in the circumstances of
the plaintiff should have taken evasive action to avoid the impact: Foreman
v. Mortz, 2001 BCSC 95; Dionne v. Romanick, 2007 BCSC 436; Farand
v. Siedel, 2013 BCSC 323; Paskall v. Scheithauer, 2014 BCCA 26.

[19]        
The fact that the plaintiff was wearing dark clothing and using a dark
umbrella is not evidence in and of itself that she was contributorily negligent.
She was entitled to wear whatever colour and clothes that was appropriate that
evening and there was no evidence that her failure to wear light clothing would
have prevented being struck (Achilleos v. Nix, 2000 BCSC 1422).

[20]        
The plaintiff was in a marked crosswalk, although probably running. The
left front of the defendant’s vehicle struck the plaintiff who was moving from
the defendant’s right to left. The plaintiff was there to be seen.

[21]        
In my judgment the evidence falls short of establishing any negligence
on the part of the plaintiff. The defendant is 100% liable for the Accident.

IV.           
Damages

[22]        
It is on the background of the plaintiff’s pre-Accident medical, social,
recreational, psychological and physical background that the court must assess the
consequences that the Accident had on her ability to function.

A.             
The Plaintiff’s Pre-Accident Background

[23]        
The plaintiff was born in Toronto. She is presently 43 years old. She
described a hard childhood having been subjected to and endured physical, emotional
and sexual abuse since age five. At age 13, she disclosed the abuse to her
teacher. She was removed from her home and subsequently lived in five different
foster homes until age 16 when she left foster care.

[24]        
She dropped out of high school when she became pregnant with her first
child. She later went to college taking a two year recreational leadership
course as a mature student. She completed that course in 1994. After college,
she obtained her GED.

[25]        
She has a spotty and somewhat confusing work history. What I could glean
from her evidence is that she worked for State Farm Insurance in the public
affairs department for approximately 1 ½ years, for the International Order of
Foresters for approximately 1 ½ years and then from 2000 to 2003, for a husband
and wife team of doctors who ran a health care practice in Toronto. In each
case, her duties were that of an administrative assistant. She earned $1,500
per month plus “unlimited health care” when she worked for the doctors.

[26]        
In 1995, her daughter Brittany was born. At age two, Brittany began
showing signs of an abnormal development and she was subsequently diagnosed
with Rhett’s Syndrome, which is by all accounts a terrible disease with no
cure. And it is degenerative. Brittany will require palliative care at some
point. Brittany developed epilepsy, chronic respiratory issues, and is
physically unable to look after herself. A lift is required to move her in and
out of her wheelchair. Cognitively, Brittany has a normal mind but can only
communicate with her eyes. She has required 24 hour care for many years. Remarkably,
Brittany attended regular school with the assistance of a Certified Education
Assistant and was able to graduate grade 12 this year.

[27]        
The plaintiff has been Brittany’s health care provider, tutor,
recreational coordinator and advocate. Caring for Brittany is difficult and
emotionally and physically draining. She gets some respite each night because
Brittany has a nurse watching over things.

[28]        
The plaintiff has had relationships in the past that have not worked out.
She was not married to Brittany’s father.

[29]        
The plaintiff became interested in Eastern Medicine techniques by chance.
In the early 2000’s her then husband suggested she see a Chinese doctor to deal
with back issues she was then having. The treatments this doctor gave her cured
her back complaints.

[30]        
The plaintiff was intent on learning Eastern medicine and how it could be
incorporated into traditional Western medicine to help Brittany and herself. She
studied books, learned the teachings of Buddha and constantly engaged herself in
discussions with others regarding Eastern medicine techniques.

[31]        
She found that she loved the work and the challenge. In 2005, she went
to China to learn the technique of “no-touch massage” and Xiu Lian – wisdom
based knowledge.

[32]        
In 2003, she stopped working with the Toronto doctors because of health
issues. She developed a migraine condition, body tremors, a serious food allergy
and one side of her face dropped.

[33]        
She has not worked since.

[34]        
There were numerous investigations conducted by Ontario doctors into her
health with seemingly no conclusive diagnosis. The plaintiff’s evidence was
that these issues resolved by 2006.

[35]        
In 2007, she started thinking about a move to British Columbia. There
were many reasons for the move including better weather, better health care
support, better wheelchair accessibility for Brittany, and her assessment that
BC is more receptive to alternative health care than Ontario. She had also
developed a network of connections in BC in the world of Eastern medicine.

[36]        
There was much planning required before the move could take place,
mainly to ensure there would be nurses, health care and education support in
place for Brittany when they arrived.

[37]        
The move to BC took place in November, 2008. Upon arrival, the plaintiff
was accepted for and has received disability under the PWD program. She
receives approximately $900 per month. After she pays rent, she is left with
$300 per month. She is able to earn up to $800 per month before her disability
benefits are affected.

[38]        
The plaintiff’s evidence was that in the two years before the Accident,
her mental and physical health was at the point that she was able to cope quite
well. In the months before the Accident, she had developed an alternative and
complementary health care business relationship with Dr. Sabrina Chen-See, a
Vancouver Family Wellness Chiropractor. She was in the process of starting her
own business called Pacific Spirit Wellness (“Pacific Spirit”) in association
with Dr. Chen-See. The grand opening of their new office in the Fairmont
Medical Building on West Broadway in Vancouver took place on November 17, 2010,
some three weeks prior to the Accident.

B.             
The Plaintiff’s Injuries

1.              
Plaintiff’s Position

[39]        
The plaintiff’s position is that despite the physical, emotional and
sexual abuse she endured as a child and despite the other challenges she has
had including the difficulties with pre-Accident relationships, neurological
issues and raising Brittany, by 2006 she was functioning relatively well. In
November 2008, she organized and executed a move to British Columbia and made
arrangements for Brittany to be enrolled in the provincial health care system.
In the months prior to the Accident, she was energetic and optimistic about
developing Pacific Spirit into a successful life coaching and counselling
business and had ceased taking prescription medications.

[40]        
She described her injuries from the Accident as pain across her chest
and into her lower abdomen, a sore left ankle, sore back, neck and cognitive issues
including difficulty with concentration, focus, word finding difficulty, memory
problems and anxiety.

[41]        
In the weeks that followed the Accident she was having significant
difficulty looking after Brittany and needed assistance. As time progressed,
her symptoms improved. She sought various treatments some of which were helpful.
She continues to suffer from pain in her right ankle, pelvis and uterus and
pain on the left-side of her body, left-sided ribcage, back and neck. She finds
the ongoing pain quite limiting. She takes medications that she was not taking
prior to the Accident.

[42]        
Cognitive symptoms relate mainly to her concentration and focus. She has
lost confidence and continues to be limited by pain.

[43]        
The plaintiff’s pre-Accident physical and psychological history is
relevant to the impact the Accident had on her and to the difficulty she has
had recovering from the injuries she sustained. The plaintiff says that she
experienced an aggravation of her pre-existing psychological condition and with
time, she is hopeful that her symptoms will return to the pre-Accident
baseline. As a result of her pre-existing make-up, she was particularly
susceptible to experiencing a greater degree of symptoms and functional
difficulties than would a person who did not have her psychological make-up.

[44]        
Regardless, in the months leading up to the Accident, she was coping
with her responsibilities and looking forward to developing her business. Her
mindset was positive. The plaintiff argues that she developed chronic pain
following the Accident and despite her diligent efforts to try and recover, she
remains restricted and her chronic pain is likely to continue indefinitely. The
plaintiff seeks general damages of $85,000.

2.              
Defendant’s Position

[45]        
The defendant’s position is that the plaintiff’s entire case revolves
around her being a reliable historian and witness. The defendant says she was
neither.

[46]        
The plaintiff relies on the medical opinions of Dr. Eichhorst, Dr. Parhar,
Dr. Patel and Dr. Travlos in support of the diagnosis and prognosis
of the injuries  she says she sustained in the Accident. To the extent that
those reports rely on the plaintiff’s ability to supply an accurate history of
her pre-Accident medical, physical and psychological health, the circumstances
of the Accident and her post-Accident symptoms and functions, the defendant
argues they should be given little weight because the plaintiff is not a
reliable historian or witness. The defendant points to examples:

a)    on
direct examination the plaintiff had a good recall for specific details that
were intended to assist her claim including details of events in Ontario in the
1990s and early 2000s. However, many of her answers on cross-examination were
non-responsive and on occasion she was argumentative and uncooperative.

b)    the
plaintiff gave evidence of a severe migraine and “pseudo-seizure” condition with
an insidious onset in 2003 that forced her to leave her job. After numerous
investigations, she says it spontaneously resolved. Yet, in 2008, she was
referred to Dr. Tyndel, a neurologist in Toronto. She provided him with a long
list of symptoms that she was experiencing. Despite the plaintiff’s lack of
memory concerning the details of the various assessments that were undertaken
in Ontario to determine the cause of her migraine and pseudo-seizure condition,
she was able to confirm that Exhibit 8 was an accurate listing of those
symptoms she had experienced.

c)     Although
her position is that she continues to experience physical and cognitive
impairment, she attended trial for three consecutive days without any
indication of physical discomfort. She also gave her evidence in an articulate
fashion although argumentative to some degree.

d)    she
was collecting disability benefits for depression at the time of the Accident
yet denied suffering from depression. Her evidence was that she did not feel
she was “clinically depressed” but was on disability because she was having a
tough time finding a job.

e)    She
minimized the effects of her pre-Accident medical history including a 1989
motor-vehicle collision (where she was an un-seat belted passenger in a vehicle
that was t-boned and her head hit the glass) and the effects of a March 2009
fall in the bathroom resulting in a broken nose and head injury.

f)     
She exaggerated evidence she felt would assist her case, including
suggesting that she was thrown upwards of 40 metres after being struck by the
defendant’s vehicle.

g)    When
confronted with post-Accident medical records containing inconsistent versions
of the circumstances of the Accident she supposedly related to her various
treating professionals, she responded that she could not recall having had those
conversations.

h)    she
stated that for one year after the Accident, she was unable to get off the
couch or toilet without assistance, was unable to bathe without assistance and
needed a cane to get around. However, according to Mr. Pham, one of her
witnesses, she was able to lead meditation sessions in her home. This is also inconsistent
with her telling Dr. Eichhorst that, within 6 months of the Accident, she
was hiking three to five kilometers without difficulty. Likewise, it is
inconsistent with her evidence that she attended various appointments during
that time.

i)      
Dr. Travlos’ opinion is that she was using the cane in an effort to
validate her injuries.

j)     
she also consistently advised her post-Accident medical practitioners
that she had no relevant pre-Accident medical history. For example, she
reported to Dr. Patel that she was emotionally healthy in the seven years
dating up to the Accident, failing to mention that she was on disability for
depression at the time of the Accident.

[47]        
The defendant argues that the plaintiff is simply unwilling to accept
medical opinions that are not in accordance with her own views of her health be
it pre or post-Accident.

[48]        
The defendant argues that although the plaintiff likely sustained
injuries from being struck by the defendant’s vehicle, she is such an unreliable
witness that her evidence about the effects have had on her post-Accident life cannot
be accepted. As was stated by Chief Justice McEachern in Price v. Kostryba,
[1982] B.C.J. No. 1518 at para. 4 citing his own decision Butler v.
Blaylock, decided 7 October 1981, Vancouver No. B781505 (unreported):

I am not stating any new principle when I say that the court
should be exceedingly careful when there is little or no objective evidence of
continuing injury and when complaints of pain persist for long periods
extending beyond the normal or usual recovery.

An injured person is entitled to
be fully and properly compensated for any injury or disability caused by a
wrongdoer. But no one can expect his fellow citizen or citizens to compensate
him in the absence of convincing evidence – which could be just his own
evidence if the surrounding circumstances are consistent – that his complaints
of pain are true reflections of a continuing injury.

[49]        
The defendant argues that at most, the plaintiff sustained a mild
concussion, now resolved, a grade one soft-tissue injury and an aggravation of
her pre-existing psychological condition including depression. Any ongoing
symptoms the plaintiff have are not related to the Accident. The defendant
argues that a non-pecuniary damage award of $30,000 is appropriate.

3.              
The Medical Evidence

[50]        
Four medical/legal reports were tendered on behalf of the plaintiff:

1.       Dr. N.
Eichhorst, the plaintiff’s family doctor since January 17, 2011;

2.       Dr. Gurdeep
Parhar, General Practice, Occupational and Disability Medicine who first
assessed the plaintiff on May 31, 2013;

3.       Dr. Jamie
Patel, psychologist who first saw the plaintiff on October 17, 2013; and

4.       Dr. Andrew
Travlos, physiatrist, who assessed the plaintiff November 4, 2011, February 3,
2012 and May 18, 2012.

[51]        
The defendant tendered two medical/legal reports:

1.       Dr. Auby
Axler, psychiatrist; and

2.       Dr. Wayne
Pisesky, orthopedic surgeon.

[52]        
Neither of the defence experts met or assessed the plaintiff. Their
reports and opinions were based on a review of the pre and post-Accident
medical records and reports provided to them.

[53]        
All of the medical experts testified and were cross-examined on their
reports and opinions. All agreed that, in forming their opinions, they relied
upon the history that the plaintiff provided to them directly, or in the case
of the defence experts, the doctors who prepared the records/reports that they
reviewed. Fundamental to these opinions is the assumption that the information
provided by the plaintiff was accurate.

[54]        
On balance, I did not find the medical opinions overly contentious. They
were helpful in establishing the plaintiff’s current level of physical,
psychological and cognitive functioning.

[55]        
In evidence is a consultation report dated March 25, 2008 from Dr.
Tyndel, the plaintiff’s treating neurologist in Scarborough Ontario, directed to
Dr. Moss, the plaintiff’s family doctor. The report relates to an assessment
for “seizure like activity” (Exhibit 8). The plaintiff provided Dr. Tyndel
with a long list of symptoms/events (approx. 39) related to non-epileptic
seizures, migraines, physical and cognitive problems. In cross-examination, she
stated that she did not know why she would have seen Dr. Tyndel in 2008 because
she was moving to BC later that year. Although she stated that she didn’t
recall the visit, she agreed that she must have seen him. She did acknowledge
the list of symptoms in Exhibit 8 stating that they were all from the time she
was suffering from migraines, which she claims resolved in 2006.

[56]        
Of the six medical reports filed in evidence, I found the reports of Drs. Patel
and Travlos to be the most helpful in understanding who the plaintiff was
before the Accident (Dr. Patel) and the effects the injuries have had on
the plaintiff post-Accident (Dr. Travlos).

[57]        
Dr. Patel is a psychologist. She initially met the plaintiff on
October 17, 2013 and at that time diagnosed that she was suffering from
adjustment disorder with depressed mood and a post-traumatic stress disorder.
After a period of psychological intervention and treatment, Dr. Patel’s current
opinion is that the plaintiff continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress
disorder (chronic) and an adjustment disorder with depressed mood in partial
remission. It is Dr. Patel’s opinion that the Accident triggered these psychological
conditions. Her symptoms do not fully meet the criteria for somatic symptom
disorder. She describes the plaintiff as a vulnerable person prior to the Accident,
but was nonetheless able to successfully relocate to British Columbia, arrange
for her disabled daughter to be taken care of, was socially connected, and made
plans to commence her own counselling business.

[58]        
On this background of vulnerability, Dr. Patel believes the Accident
triggered her post-traumatic stress disorder and adjustment disorder with
depressed mood. Dr. Patel first assessed the plaintiff on October, 17, 2013.
She has been providing psychological counselling from time to time to the date
of trial. Her report states:

Based on my initial interviews
with Ms. Suedat, and the questionnaire data, I was of the initial opinion that
Ms. Suedat’s symptoms met the criteria for an Adjustment Disorder with
Depressed Mood, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Since my initial assessment,
I had provided a brief trial of psychological intervention. Currently, I am of
the opinion that she still meets the criteria of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
(chronic) and an Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood in partial remission

Based on my psychological
treatment sessions with Ms. Suedat, I do find that she struggles with chronic
pain, however, her symptoms do not fully meet the criteria for a Somatic
Symptom Disorder

Her history of childhood trauma
is suggestive that Ms. Suedat is a vulnerable individual; however, prior to
this accident of December 7, 2010, she demonstrated the ability to be a
caretaker for her disabled daughter, successfully relocate provinces, and make
plans to set up her own business

Although Ms. Suedat’s background
suggests some vulnerability, it is my opinion that Ms. Sudat’s current trauma
symptoms are referable to her accident of December 7, 2010, and that in the
absence of this accident she would not have developed Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder or an Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood

With respect to her prognosis,
Ms. Sudat’s emotional recovery is likely to be affected by a number of factors,
such as her physical improvement, the availability of medical and psychological
interventions, and the absence of having other traumatic events. As far as Ms.
Suedat’s short term prognosis is concerned, that is for the next four to six
months, it is somewhat guarded; but, with psychological intervention, her
functioning can be improved. A long-term prognosis of a positive psychological
recovery is achievable contingent on the availability of psychological and
medical interventions and a positive response to her medical intervention.

[59]        
Dr. Travlos is a physiatrist who saw the plaintiff on three
occasions, November 4, 2011, February 3, 2012 and May 18, 2012 on referral from
Dr. Eichhorst. Dr. Travlos had arranged for a follow-up assessment on
November 20, 2012 but the plaintiff did not attend. Based on his initial
assessment, Dr. Travlos felt that, at most, she sustained a mild
concussion. Because her cognitive condition was deteriorating, he felt there
were non-Accident related psycho-social issues contributing to her mental
health. When he last saw her, the plaintiff was making progress with her
recovery. He stressed to her the importance of the plaintiff getting exercise.

[60]        
Dr. Travlos’ comments:

1.         Concussion

…she had relatively good recall of the events other than a
few seconds at most. Ms. Suedat’s history to Dr. Patel was that she
did not recall being hit and her next memory was waking up on the ground, which
is not quite consistent with early history. What is, however, of relevance is
that the nursing records from Burnaby Hospital noted that she was screaming at
the scene, and she indeed informed Dr. Patel that she screamed five times
before calling 9-1-1 herself. All this information shows variable recall, as
normally expected for anybody and not just due to the effects of a concussion.
All one can say is that at most Ms. Suedat suffered a few seconds of
amnesia, following which she had full cognitive capacity to make decisions and
plans, such as to get herself out of the road and into safety and then call
9-1-1. These are not decisions made by a confused individual, even though she
may have felt confused. It is my opinion that at most Ms. Suedat suffered
a very mild concussion.

Ms. Suedat’s cognitive symptoms following the accident
may have reflected the presence of a concussion but were more likely caused by
other factors, in particular given the fact that she noted that she
deteriorated with time (rather than the expected recovery even from a
concussion). Diagnosis such as sleep deprivation, pain, post-traumatic stress
disorder and depression are all factors that compound the presence of cognitive
alteration. This is of relevance, in that despite the fact that I had suggested
to her that she needed counselling all along, she only really sought
counselling from Dr. Patel at Chuck Jung Associates almost three years
after the accident. At that time, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder, a condition that has the best success of treatment when treated early
on.

…It is my opinion that Ms. Suedat’s primary presentation
is not that related to a concussion although one could not rule out at least
some symptoms from it.

2.         Psycho-social

Ms. Suedat clearly has long-standing emotional health
issues. Her statement to Dr. Patel that she was only willing to go back
seven years in terms of her mental health history is telling. She described a
significant traumatic childhood and adolescence, and these are all factors that
one cannot ignore in terms of the ongoing presence of symptoms. An individual’s
ongoing mental health issues come with a history that paints a picture of their
vulnerability, along with their managing and coping abilities. …As stated from
the beginning, it was my opinion Ms. Suedat was in need of ongoing therapy
and counselling, despite her mistrust of Western medicine. It is of relevance
that she responded very favourably to anti-depressant medication, but felt
unable to continue taking them.

3.         Pains

Ms. Suedat’s pains when
first seen were fairly non-specific and covered her abdomen and groin region.
Her back examination, however, revealed multiple areas of tenderness and at the
time I thought that she might have had a chronic pain condition known as
fibromyalgia but she did not quite have enough tender points to make up the
diagnosis. …It appears to me…that her areas of pain and her pain overall
severity had increased from the last time I saw her. This would fit the pattern
of an individual with somatic symptom disorder. The latter is a disorder of pain,
previously known as chronic pain disorder, in which individuals have chronic
ongoing pain with or without the presence of underlying organic causes.

It is of note that Ms. Suedat was using a quad-cane when
I first saw her. A quad-cane is a cane with four feet on it, and one typically
used by frail, elderly people to assist with balance, as they cannot really
balance enough with one cane. It would be hard to explain Ms. Suedat’s
choice of this type of cane for support, other than to display an outward behaviour
of pain and disability.

…The behavioural presentation was again repeated when she was
asked to walk without the cane. She then started to walk as if she was newly
blind person with her hands reaching out variably in space to assist with her
balance despite the fact that there was no underlying neurologic source or
cause for instability such as a neuropathy, a spinal cord injury, vision loss,
or other such entity that would perhaps necessitate such a need. The only
explanation was that this was an outward display of disability for her
perceived instability of balance.

The best treatment for patients with chronic pain such as Ms. Suedat
is proper treatment of their mental health issues, improved sleep and physical
mobilization and activation.

4.         Causality

It would appear to me that Ms. Suedat was an individual
with significant susceptibility to difficulties and problems following a new
event for injury.

5.         Prognosis

Ms. Suedat’s prognosis depends materially on the
prognosis of her mental health.

6.         Function

It was, and remains, my opinion
that she was capable of being more active than she displayed. …I would expect
her to be able to return back to normal as soon as her mental health improves.

[61]        
I accept the opinions of Drs. Patel and Travlos. Due to her psychological
make-up, the plaintiff was a vulnerable individual who was extremely
susceptible to decompensation after a traumatic event such as the Accident. I
find that the Accident has exacerbated the plaintiff’s pre-Accident
psychological condition. But for the Accident the plaintiff would not likely
have suffered the psychological disorders diagnosed by Dr. Patel.

[62]        
She has met the onus of establishing that the Accident triggered her
psychological disorder: Yoshikawa v. Yu (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 318
(C.A.); Andrews v. Mainster, 2014 BCSC 541.

[63]        
The plaintiff was described by Dr. Eichhorst as eccentric. I agree that
is an appropriate characterization of her presentation. However, she is who she
is and the fact that she has reacted to the events of December 7, 2010 in a manner
that many would consider unusual does not, necessarily, make her claim
illegitimate. If her symptoms are genuinely felt and she is not consciously
exaggerating or feigning — and I find that to be the case — she is entitled
to compensation for the losses she has suffered.

[64]        
Both Drs. Travlos and Patel agree that the key to a positive future for
the plaintiff is successful treatment of her mental health. Both are optimistic
for her future.

[65]        
Although I do not accept portions of the plaintiff’s evidence and I
agree with the points made by the defendant as summarized in paragraph 46 of
these reasons, on balance I am satisfied that the plaintiff did suffer a
triggering of a psychological condition that developed into a psychologically
based pain disorder. I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s somewhat eccentric
reaction to being hit in the Accident was sub-consciously based and was not
something that she was able to control.

C.             
Discussion

[66]        
The defendant must take his victim as he finds her. Despite the
relatively innocuous nature of the impact, the plaintiff has not yet returned
to her pre-Accident level of function. Simply put, the plaintiff was the wrong
person to hit. She had a fragile psychological makeup and was susceptible to
long lasting issues from an Accident of this nature.

[67]        
In order to determine the consequences of the Accident, it is important
to establish the base line of who plaintiff was prior to the Accident, where
should would have been, physically, psychologically, socially, recreationally
and spiritually but for the Accident, and compare that to how she is
functioning physically, psychologically, socially, recreationally and
spiritually as a result of any injuries the Accident may have caused. The
Accident can be said to have caused the plaintiff’s injuries if it materially
contributed to the occurrence of the injuries. If it falls outside the de
minimus range it will be considered material (Athey v. Leonati, [1996]
3 S.C.R. 458).

[68]        
I am satisfied that despite the plaintiff’s difficult upbringing and
life circumstances, she was functioning at a level that was above what it has
been since the Accident.

[69]        
The lay witnesses called by the plaintiff, whose evidence I accept, all
describe her before the Accident as a happy, vibrant, energetic person who was
full of ambition to move forward with her life. They say she is now quiet,
reserved with far less energy. In short, a different person. However, they say
that she has improved cognitively with the passage of time to the point that
she is now able to communicate better than she could initially after the
Accident.

[70]        
Starting in 2003, she immersed herself in Eastern Medicine culture, Feng
Shui and other modes of Eastern medicine, seeking to learn as much as she could.
She wanted to impart what she learned on others through meditation and life
skills classes.

[71]        
Respecting the plaintiff’s pre-Accident health status,
Drs. Eichhorst, Parhar, Patel and Travlos did not have the benefit of
reviewing medical records pre-dating the Accident. Instead, they relied on the
plaintiff being accurate in providing her medical history.

[72]        
Unfortunately, I find that she was not.

[73]        
Drs. Axler and Pisesky had the benefit of reviewing the plaintiff’s
pre-Accident records from Ontario. Those records paint a picture of a plaintiff
who was struggling in life both physically and psychologically. The plaintiff
claims that all of these investigations were for a migraine condition and
pseudo-seizures which were completely resolved by 2006.

[74]        
Contrary to the plaintiff’s evidence, I find that in the months and
years leading up to the Accident, many of her pre-Accident issues were ongoing,
at least to some degree. She was not as symptom free as she suggests.

[75]        
I am, however, satisfied that, she was functioning at a level that
allowed her to establish a new life in B.C., become socially engaged and take
steps to start a new business. The level of that function was reduced by the
Accident.

1.              
General Damages

[76]        
There is a lack of reliable evidence on the severity of the impact
between the plaintiff and the defendant’s car. Despite the plaintiff’s
suggestion that she was thrown 40 meters, I find that she was not. The impact
was nothing like that.

[77]        
There was no evidence of damage, or lack of damage, to the defendant’s
vehicle. The plaintiff suffered no bruising, bleeding, swelling or broken bones.
The attending police officer, Constable Hadwin, did not take any photographs at
the scene. His recollection of any investigation he may have done was vague and
unhelpful.

[78]        
I have considered the submissions of counsel and the authorities
provided by them. Authorities provided by the plaintiff include: Andrews; Johal
v. Meyede, 2013 BCSC 2381; Martin v. Nova Scotia (Worker’s Compensation
Board), [2000] N.S.J. No. 353 (C.A.); Stephenson v. Lee, 2013 BCSC
1617; Zhang v. Law, 2009 BCSC 991 and Tsalamandris v. MacDonald, 2012
BCCA 239. Authorities provided by the defendant include: Abdalle v. British
Columbia (Minister of Public Safety and
Solicitor General), 2012 BCSC
128; Frayne v. Alleman, 2006 BCSC 1988 and Healey v. Chung, 2014
BCSC 429.

[79]        
I have also considered the factors that the court should consider when
assessing the plaintiff’s general damage claim. Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006
BCCA 34, leave to appeal ref’d 361 N.R. 391n (S.C.C.)

[80]        
In sum, despite all of the issues and challenges the plaintiff had over
her lifetime, the evidence suggests that in the two years leading up to the Accident,
she was coping. She had a number of challenges and stressors in her life that continued
to exist, including depression (for which she was on a provincial disability),
managing Brittany’s daily needs and attempting to establish a new business.

[81]        
The effect the Accident has had must be measured on how it has affected
her, and not how it may have affected the average individual. The defendant is
not entitled have a perfect plaintiff.

[82]        
Although by many standards the Accident would be considered relatively
minor, I find that the Accident has had a significant impact on the plaintiff
and will continue to have an impact on her until her mental health issues have
been addressed. Given the long-standing pre-Accident history of mental health
issues, I find that she would have had issues with her mental health continuing
into the future in any event of the Accident. The Accident exacerbated her
mental health condition and has made her less functional than she would
otherwise have been. Taking these factors into account, I assess her damages
under this head at $50,000.

2.              
Special Damages

[83]        
The plaintiff submitted a book of special damages containing various
invoices and a summary of her special damages claim. It was marked as Exhibit
7. Some of the amounts claimed in the summary are not supported by invoices and
have not been proven.

[84]        
Starting in October 2011 and running into February 2012, the plaintiff’s
previous lawyer hired an occupational therapist and rehabilitation assistant to
assess the plaintiff and commence a physical rehabilitation program for her. The
program included a pool program. The plaintiff stated it was beneficial. The
plaintiff claims reimbursement of six accounts from Turning Point
Rehabilitation Consulting Ltd. totalling $10,406.76. I have reviewed these
accounts and am satisfied that they were reasonably incurred by the plaintiff
for her rehabilitation and they will be allowed.

[85]        
The plaintiff also seeks reimbursement of expenses incurred for home
care services provided by KARP Home Care from October, 2011 through February
2012. Although the plaintiff claims that there were five invoices from KARP
home care dated October 31, 2011, November 30, 2011, December 31, 2011, January
31, 2012 and February 15, 2012, the December and January invoices (apparently
$448 each) are not in evidence and therefore have not been proven. I am
satisfied that the remaining home care expenses were reasonably incurred in the
circumstances of the plaintiff’s efforts to overcome her injuries and they will
be allowed in the sum of $672.

[86]        
The plaintiff also claims for the cost of Anoosha Agahkani Vanora
Wellness counselling sessions in the amount of $268.80 for two sessions of
counselling: December 7, 2011 and December 14, 2011. That sum is allowed. The
plaintiff’s summary of special damages includes 14 other sessions from November
30, 2011 through February 15, 2012, however no invoices for those other
sessions are in evidence and they have therefore not been proven.

[87]        
The plaintiff seeks reimbursement for five physiotherapy sessions in
December, 2011 and January 2012 at Planet Ice South Coquitlam Physiotherapy. My
review of the invoices discloses that these physiotherapy treatments were for a
vestibular therapy assessment and treatments. I am not satisfied that the
plaintiff has proven a need for vestibular therapy from injuries arising out of
the Accident so this claim is dis-allowed.

[88]        
The plaintiff’s claim for four sessions of physiotherapy from Burnaby
Heights Physiotherapy totalling $88 is also dismissed because no receipts or
proof of that expense are in evidence.

[89]        
The plaintiff’s claim for taxi expenses to and from treatment is allowed
in the amount of $1,423.80. This sum is the total amount of the invoices proven.
In addition, the plaintiff has proven $435 in bus passes that I am satisfied
relate to the various bus trips she needed to transport herself to and from her
various appointments.

[90]        
In October, 2013 and continuing to the date of trial, the plaintiff
sought and received psychological counselling from Dr. Patel. The evidence
from Dr. Patel and the plaintiff was that these counselling sessions were
and continue to be helpful. Given my findings regarding the plaintiff’s
psychological injuries from the Accident, the cost of these sessions was a
reasonable expense and they are allowed in the amount of $1,910, the total
amount of the receipts in evidence.

[91]        
The plaintiff’s claim for a ROHO Cushion in the amount of $530.10 is
also allowed. It was purchased on March 18, 2011 on the recommendation of the
plaintiff’s therapist. The plaintiff’s evidence was that it helped with the
management of the pain she was experiencing.

[92]        
The plaintiff has also claimed for the cost of a City of Burnaby Pool
pass. This claim is also allowed in the amount of $55.33, which is the amount
that has been proven.

[93]        
The total special damages proven and allowed are $15,701.79.

V.             
Past Wage Loss/Past Loss of Earnings Opportunity

[94]        
The plaintiff seeks an award of $81,000 in gross past loss of earnings
from the date of the Accident to the start of the trial. This claim is based
upon the assumption that had the Accident not occurred, she would have
gradually developed Spirit Wellness into a business such that by 2014, she
would have been working full time and earning $38,500 annually. This sum is the
statistical average annual earnings of Family, Marriage and other Related
Counsellors (NOC 4153).

[95]        
I accept that when the plaintiff moved to B.C. she was coping as best
she could, albeit with ongoing psychological issues. Shortly before the
Accident, she was attempting to launch Pacific Spirit in conjunction with
Dr. Chen-See. The grand opening of their new office was on November 17,
2010. The plaintiff was part of that opening. She had entered into an
“Independent Contractor Agreement” with Dr. Chen-See whereby she would have
the use of one treatment room, use of clinic facilities, and a door plaque.
They agreed to operate independent of each other and to obtain their own
business licenses and liability insurance.

[96]        
At the time of the Accident, the plaintiff did not have a business
licence to operate Pacific Spirit.

[97]        
While I accept the plaintiff had taken the first steps in developing
Pacific Spirit into a growing business, I do not accept that but for the Accident,
Pacific Spirit would have been a profitable venture and would have earned $38,500
per year. Firstly, by virtue of the contract she had with Dr. Chen-See,
she was obliged to pay 40% of revenue earned to a maximum of $2,000 per month
as her share of the cost of using one treatment room, the clinic facilities
(telephone, living room, storage room etc.) and the use of landlord supplied
washrooms, fitness room, lunch room and meeting room. In addition, she would
have had other normal business expenses such as supplies, advertising,
accounting etc.

[98]        
Secondly, she is Brittany’s primary caregiver and would have restricted
her hours of business to accommodate Brittany’s schedule. Brittany graduated
from grade 12 in June, 2014. From the time of the Accident to June, 2014, the
plaintiff would have been able to work part-time hours during the week days
developing Pacific Spirit while Brittany was in school. I find it doubtful,
however, that she would have been able to devote the time and energy that would
have been required since the Accident to annually gross $38,500 by 2014 as she
suggests.

[99]        
I am, however, satisfied that the Accident has deprived the plaintiff of
the opportunity to gradually developing Pacific Spirit into a business. For the
reasons stated, I am not satisfied that 25% of full-time earnings ($38,500) in
2011, 50% of full-time earnings in 2012, 75% of full-time earnings in 2013 and
100% of full-time earnings in 2014 is the appropriate measure of her loss. An
assessment rather than a calculation is required.

[100]     Considering
Pacific Spirit was at best a fledgling business with no revenues prior to the Accident,
the contractual arrangements with Dr. Cheng-See, and considering the
plaintiff’s personal circumstances (including Brittany and the plaintiff’s
ability to earn a maximum of $800 per month while on disability), I assess the
plaintiff’s past loss of earnings opportunity at $20,000 net of tax. This
amount is loosely based on average earnings since the Accident of $900 per
month after deducting her obligations to Dr. Cheng-See and then taking into
account positive and negative contingencies for the fact that Pacific Spirit
was in its infancy with an unknown future.

VI.           
Loss of Future Earning Capacity

[101]     For the
plaintiff to succeed under this head of damage, she must prove that, due to the
injuries she suffered in the Accident, there is a “real and substantial possibility”
that she will suffer a future loss of earnings. Once that possibility has been
established, the assessment of that future loss can be made on the earnings
approach or the capital asset approach (Perren v. Lalari, 2010 BCCA
140).

[102]     The
plaintiff argues that absent the injuries she sustained in the Accident, she
would have been at liberty to pursue her career as a life coach/counsellor. She
testified that she is still hopeful that she will be able to resume her career;
it is unknown when she will be able to start.

[103]     Drs.
Eichhorst, Parhar, Travlos and Patel provided their respective opinions
concerning the plaintiff’s prospects of being able to return to the workforce
as follows:

·      
Dr. Eichhorst:

It is my understanding that the patient was
self-employed as an eastern Medicine Counseling Care Provider. Despite attempts
and ambitions to return to work, she has been unable to do so since the accident
and remains unable to work due to reported cognitive impairments of memory,
concentration, and energy to be able to integrate information from her clients
in a meaningful way. Significant time has passed from the time of her accident.
My prognosis for full competitive return to employment remains guarded.

·      
Dr. Parhar:

Given that the underlying physical, psychological and
cognitive problems are likely permanent, which resulted from the
pedestrian/motor vehicle collision of December 7, 2010, I think it would be
reasonable to conclude that the occupational limitations they have resulting in
will also likely be permanent.

Thus, at the current juncture, I would be of the
opinion that Sabita is unlikely to be able to return to work as a healthcare
practitioner for the foreseeable future. I also believe it would be challenging
for her to find any suitable employment given her occupational limitations such
as those that resulted from her physical, psychological and cognitive
conditions that were caused by the pedestrian/motor vehicle collision of
December 7, 2010.

·      
Dr. Travlos:

At the end of the day, Ms. Suedat’s prognosis
depends materially upon the prognosis of her mental health. I would defer to my
colleagues in Psychiatry and Psychology for their further opinions regarding
the prognosis of her mental health. This is also clearly interdependent upon
her psychosocial situation and the stresses and difficulties that she has had
in life in general and in particular those related to her disabled daughter.

At the time of my assessments of Ms. Suedat, it
was, and remains, my opinion that she was capable of being more active than she
displayed. I would encourage her to increase her activity level, and from my
perspective she is capable of doing activities around the home. Indeed, she
must be encouraged to be as active as she can tolerate. I would not
specifically restrict her activities for simple daily activities and I would
encourage her to do non-dangerous recreational activities as well. She will
have limitations in terms of her socialization because of issues pertaining to
feeling poorly, lack of energy, anxiety, etc., but again the prognosis here depends
on her mental health treatment and I would expect her to be able to return back
to normal, assuming her mental health improves.

·      
Dr. Patel:

With respect to her prognosis, Ms. Suedat’s
emotional recovery is likely to be affected by a number of factors, such as her
physical improvement, the availability of medical and psychological
interventions, and the absence of having other traumatic events. As far as Ms. Suedat’s
short term prognosis is concerned, that is for the next four to six months, it
is somewhat guarded; but, with psychological intervention, her functioning can
be improved. a long-term prognosis of a positive psychological recovery is
achievable contingent on the availability of psychological and medical interventions
and a positive response to her medical intervention. I feel that as long as she
continues to suffer from her physical injuries, limitations, and pain, the
symptoms of depression and anxiety will be perpetuated. Ms. Suedat’s
emotional recovery is likely to be affected by a number of factors, such as her
physical improvement, the availability of psychological and medical
interventions, and the absence of having other traumatic events.

[104]     I agree
with Drs. Travlos and Patel that the plaintiff’s ability to function well in
the future will depend to a large degree on her mental health. In my judgment,
to the extent the plaintiff suffered physical injuries in the Accident, they
have long since resolved and any physical pain she continues to experience is
psychologically based.

[105]     I am
satisfied that with ongoing treatment, the plaintiff’s mental health will
improve and she will be able to function in her chosen vocation to the same
extent and in the same capacity that she would have been functioning but for
the Accident. I am satisfied that the plaintiff has proven on a balance of
probabilities that there is a real and substantial possibility that she will
suffer a loss of earnings in the future as a result of her mental health
disorder that was triggered by the Accident. She is entitled to an award for
that loss.

[106]     In
assessing the award, positive and negative contingencies must be considered.

[107]     Relying on
Pearlman J.’s decision in Andrews, the plaintiff seeks $150,000 for loss
of future earnings which she says represents roughly two years of projected
earnings as a counsellor.

[108]     In
considering the medical evidence respecting the plaintiff’s future, I give more
weight to Dr. Travlos’ opinion than I do to the opinions of Drs. Eichhorst
and Parhar, both of whom accepted the plaintiff’s history regarding the Accident
as correct. They were not privy to the plaintiff’s pre-Accident medical history.
I agree with Dr. Travlos that once the plaintiff has had the benefit of mental
health counselling, she will return to her pre-Accident function. I expect she
will be able to resume her pre-Accident vocational abilities and be back to
developing her counselling practice within the next 12 – 18 months.

[109]     Nevertheless,
she has been put behind by four years to date, and it will be another year
before she is up to speed. The evidence satisfies me that she was beginning to
establish a business presence in the field of counselling and, with her
personality, would likely have been modestly successful, although I doubt that
she would have earned anything like what she suggests.

[110]     She was on
provincial government disability since moving to BC in 2008 and would likely to
have continued to be on disability for the foreseeable future.

[111]     In my
judgment, her earnings would have averaged in the $1,000 – $2,000 per month
range had the Accident not happened. Projecting that into the future and taking
into account that the opportunity she had to build her business has been
delayed by the Accident, I assess damages under this head at $30,000.

VII.          
Future Care Costs

[112]     It is
difficult to be precise about what the plaintiff’s future care expenses and
requirements will be. Nevertheless, the court is required to fix the amount
based on the evidence presented at trial, adjusting for reasonable
contingencies (Van v. Howlett, 2014 BCSC 1404). The award must be based
on what is reasonably necessary to attempt to put the plaintiff in the same
position she would have been in had the injury(s) not occurred (Langulle v. Nguyen,
2013 BCSC 1460). Beyond the need for medical justification for the items
claimed, there should be evidence that the plaintiff will likely use the
recommended care (Langulle; O’Connell v. Yung, 2012 BCCA 57)

[113]     Psychological
counselling has been recommended by Drs. Eichhorst, Patel and Travlos.

[114]     Specifically,
Dr. Patel recommends an initial regime of 42 psychological treatments over the
next 30 months to manage the plaintiff’s mental condition. These treatments
would twice per month for 12 months and then once per month for 18 months. She
recommends the plaintiff then be reassessed.

[115]     I agree
with these recommendations.

[116]     The
evidence is that the cost is $185 per treatment. The total cost will be $7,770.
In addition, I find that she will experience flare-ups on occasion and will
benefit from follow-up sessions. All things considered, I award $10,000 for
future counselling sessions.

[117]     The
plaintiff also claims for future cost of physiotherapy ($2,600), cushions
($530) and home care assistance ($5,200). Given my findings that her ongoing complaints
relate to her psychological health and not her physical health, her claim for
these items is disallowed.

VIII.        
Summary

[118]     In sum,
the defendant is 100% responsible for the December 7, 2010 Accident. The
plaintiff is entitled to damages as follows:

a.       General
damages:                                         $50,000.00

b.       Special
damages:                                          $15,701.79

c.       Past
Loss of Earnings Potential:                     $20,000.00

d.       Loss of
Future Earnings Potential:                  $30,000.00

e.       Future
Care Costs: $10,000.00

Total Damages: $125,701.79

[119]     The
plaintiff is entitled to interest on special damages and past loss of earnings
potential in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act.

[120]    
Subject to matters of which I am unaware, the plaintiff is also entitled
to costs.

“G.P.
Weatherill J.”