IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Date: 20120911

Docket: M102388

Registry:
Vancouver

Between:

Maya Adriana Naks,
an infant by her
Litigation Guardian, Anna Sawicka

Plaintiff

And

Mark R. Hesse and
Meghan Elizabeth Smith

Defendants

Before: The Honourable Madam
Justice Miriam Maisonville

Reasons for Judgment

1.              
INTRODUCTION

[1]            
Maya Adriana Naks Williams, an infant, is the plaintiff in an action for
damages arising from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on
February 26, 2005.  Ms. Sawicka, her litigation guardian, is her
aunt.  Her older sister, Brandy, also brings an action for damages.

[2]            
The sisters have taken the surname of their mother’s husband.  They now
also have two step-siblings.  The family lives in West Palm Beach, Florida.

[3]            
The vehicle the plaintiff was travelling in was a 2000 green Ford Focus
(the “plaintiff’s vehicle”).  The car was being driven by her mother, Alexandra
Williams nee Naks.  The plaintiff was in the front passenger seat.  Also in the
car was her older sister, who sat behind her in the back seat.

[4]            
The plaintiff was born on March 5, 1998, and was 6 years of
age at the time of the accident.

2.              
THE ACCIDENT

[5]            
The plaintiff’s vehicle was travelling eastbound on 49^th Avenue,
in Vancouver, British Columbia.  The defendants’ vehicle, a 2003 gold Toyota
Corolla, was travelling northbound on Alberta Street.  At the intersection of
Alberta and 49^th Avenue, the defendant driver, Mark Hesse, failed to
stop at a stop sign.  He entered the intersection, resulting in his vehicle being
directly in the path of the plaintiff’s vehicle.  Ms. Williams, who had
the right of way, attempted to avoid collision by swerving her vehicle to the
right, but her car hit the left side of the defendant driver’s vehicle on the
driver’s side, in the area of the rear door and the quarter panel.

[6]            
Both vehicles sustained damage:  the plaintiff’s vehicle was assessed
with $4,680.19 in damages, and the defendant’s vehicle was assessed with $4,982.08
in damages.  Liability for the accident has been admitted.

[7]            
An ambulance attended at the scene of the accident, but the plaintiff
was not taken to the hospital.

3.              
POSITION OF THE PARTIES

[8]            
The defendants today bring an application pursuant to Rule 9‑7
for summary trial, asking that the matter be dismissed or, in the alternative,
that the matter proceed to summary trial for an assessment of damages.

[9]            
Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the case is appropriate for
summary trial, but, as liability has been admitted, argues the claim should not
be dismissed.  The plaintiff submits that the sole issue is a matter of
assessment of appropriate damages.

4.              
DISCUSSION

[10]        
Liability for the accident has been admitted by the defendants. 
However, the defendants submit, an issue as to the seriousness of the injuries
arises because, following an initial period wherein the plaintiff was assessed
and seen by her physician, a number of years passed in which no assessment or
treatment of the plaintiff’s injuries was made by any medical professional.

[11]        
In July 2010, the plaintiff, together with her sister and their mother,
moved to Florida in order to be with their mother’s new husband.  No medical
records have been produced from Florida.

[12]        
As a consequence of liability being admitted, and the defendants’
submission that the defendants were responsible for the accident, I do not dismiss
the claim.

[13]        
I turn now to the issue that was focussed on before the Court in
the oral hearing – the assessment of damages of the plaintiff.

5.              
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

(a)           
The plaintiff prior to the accident

[14]        
Prior to the accident, the plaintiff was in grade 1 at Lord Selkirk
Elementary School in Vancouver, British Columbia.  She was receiving good
report cards.  These were in evidence before the Court and showed the plaintiff
was an A and B student.  Her teachers also advised her mother that she was
doing excellently in school.  She was active physically.  She took ballet class
and, together with her sister, was active in the school’s ice skating program. 
She had her seventh birthday the weekend following the accident.  At that time
she was living with her mother and older sister in Vancouver, British Columbia.

(b)           
After the accident

[15]        
Immediately after the accident, the plaintiff did not attend the doctor. 
However, on the next business day, her mother took her to her family doctor, Dr. Irena
Lukowska.

6.              
MEDICAL CARE

(a)           
Dr. Irena Lukowska

[16]        
On February 28, 2005, Dr. Lukowska noted the plaintiff complained
of headache, stomach ache, neck and midback pain, and left leg pain.  The
plaintiff had suffered the headache on the intervening day between the accident
and her attendance on Dr. Lukowska.

[17]        
Dr. Lukowska prescribed cold compresses to be followed by warm
compresses, Tylenol to be taken three times daily, and massage therapy.

[18]        
Subsequent to that visit, Dr. Lukowska retired from medical
practice.  She has not provided a medical report.

(b)           
Massage Therapy, Chiropractor

[19]        
The plaintiff received both massage therapy and chiropractic treatment.

[20]        
She continued to see her family doctor for several visits, a number of
which did not appear to be connected to the accident.  From the period from
June 2005 to January 2007, she did not receive any medical care from any
medical care giver.

(c)           
Dr. Julian Ospina-Ordoniz

[21]        
On February 4, 2008, the plaintiff attended on Dr. Julian
Ospina-Ordoniz, a family physician in the same group as Dr. Lukowska.  Dr. Ospina-Ordoniz
completed a CL-19 form on that date and noted the plaintiff complained of
occasional neck pain and occasional low back pain radiating into the left leg. 
He wrote the plaintiff was capable of carrying out all of her “work” related
activities and had a current capability of a “very heavy workload”.  She did
not, however, according to Dr. Ospina-Ordoniz, require any additional
therapy.

[22]        
In the CL-19 form, Dr. Ospina-Ordoniz additionally noted the
objective findings he found on physical examination with respect to the
plaintiff, specifically that her spine displayed tenderness to the touch, that
she had a tender neck, and that there was tenderness to palpation of the central
cervical spine.  He diagnosed a grade 1 neck and upper back soft tissue
injury.  Dr. Ospina-Ordoniz noted, however, that the plaintiff had full
range of motion.  He filled in the form indicating the injuries were resolved.

[23]        
I find Dr. Ospina-Ordoniz’s conclusions as outlined in the CL‑19
form to be of limited assistance as he was not the plaintiff’s treating
physician and his report did not disclose that he had undertaken a thorough
review of the plaintiff’s prior condition.  The CL‑19 being a form, in
which responses are noted in the appropriate boxes, was of limited assistance
to the Court.  Furthermore, it is of note that Dr. Ospina-Ordoniz was
clearly answering to a form meant for an adult as the plaintiff, being a
student, did not in fact “work” or cope with “a heavy workload”.

(d)           
Dr. Sharon Barton

[24]        
On July 30, 2010, Dr. Sharon Barton, the general practitioner
who took over the practice of Dr. Lukowska, indicated in a medical report that
the plaintiff complained to her of neck pain and headaches, which, she said,
occurred a few times a month.  She also advised Dr. Barton that she often suffered
from low back pain which was usually triggered by back flexion.  She told the
doctor that she had difficulty sleeping which resulted in fatigue the next day.

[25]        
Dr. Barton diagnosed soft tissue injuries to the neck, thoracic
lumbar spine, and contusion to the left leg.

(e)           
Dr. P.J. Switzer

[26]        
An x-ray was ordered on March 4, 2008, and the radiologist, Dr. Switzer,
noted no abnormalities.

(f)            
Dr. Jacqueline Purtzki

[27]        
The plaintiff was seen by Dr. Jacqueline Purtzki on June 17,
2011.  At that time, Dr. Purtzki stated that the plaintiff did not recall
having any pain the first day after the accident.  While she had banged her
right knee on the dashboard in the accident, she had no ongoing problems from
that.

[28]        
Dr. Purtzki noted that the plaintiff had developed lower back pain
which was described by the plaintiff as tightness, mostly in the middle of the
back.  The plaintiff indicated it was present all the time.  She described the
intensity to Dr. Purtzki as 4 to 5 out of 10.

[29]        
Dr. Purtzki noted the plaintiff reported the headaches to be the
most bothersome symptom and that they always seem to be there.  The plaintiff
indicated they started at the time of the motor vehicle accident.

[30]        
During the examination, the plaintiff was questioned by Dr. Purtzki
about her level of physical activity.  Subsequent to the accident and prior to
her move to Florida in July 2010, the plaintiff had been quite active in school
and in sports, as well as horseback riding skiing, biking, soccer, softball and
volleyball, and swimming in the summertime.  In Florida there are no physical
education classes.

7.              
CAUSATION

[31]        
Dr. Barton stated that on reviewing the medical chart, which
included Dr. Lukowska’s earlier notes, it was her opinion that the
plaintiff’s ongoing injuries of neck and low back pain and headaches were
caused by the motor vehicle accident of 2005.  She noted that the plaintiff had
been in a prior motor vehicle accident in 2003, but there was no record of any
further symptoms in respect of that accident beyond those complaints mentioned
during the initial visit on June 25, 2003, after that accident, to her
earlier family doctor.

[32]        
The plaintiff must establish on the balance of probability that the
defendants’ negligence caused and/or materially contributed to the injuries: 
see Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, at paras. 13-17.  The question
to be considered in this case is “but for” the defendants’ negligence, would the
plaintiff have suffered the injury that she did?  see Resurfice Corp. v.
Hanke, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333; Clements v Clements, 2012 SCC 32. 
Before damages can be assessed, causation must be established on a balance of
probabilities.

[33]        
Dr. Purtzki wrote on June 17, 2011:  “[t]he MVA certainly
caused the immediate symptoms of neck pain, upper back pain and lower back pain
and knee pain.”  She also found that the plaintiff had intermittent headaches,
but that those seem to be sinus-related headaches rather than “whiplash-associated”
headaches, and Dr. Purtzski was unable to conclude in that written report
that the motor vehicle accident was the cause for all of the plaintiff’s
persistent symptoms.

[34]        
In a later report, written on May 28, 2012, Dr. Purtzki noted
that in the intervening time, the plaintiff had undergone a nuclear bone scan
which showed no abnormalities and an MRI test which was unremarkable.  She
wrote that the plaintiff had ongoing low back pain “related to a soft tissue
dysfunction” but there was “no worrisome underlying condition”.

[35]        
Dr. Purtzki indicated that secondary distress and deconditioning
relating to chronic pain was most likely due to the motor vehicle accident. 
However, it is of note that the plaintiff had enjoyed a full range of
activities after the accident, and it was not until she went to Florida, where
there is no physical education at school, that she no longer engaged in those
activities.

[36]        
The summary of the physicians’ findings is that the low back and neck
pain and headaches experienced by the plaintiff were most likely related to the
motor vehicle accident.  The headaches and the right knee pain noted continuing
in 2011 were not, however, according to the physicians’ evidence before the Court,
causally related to the motor vehicle accident.

[37]        
According to the medical reports of Drs. Barton and Purtzki, the
plaintiff sustained a soft tissue injury to her neck and lower back.  According
to Dr. Purtzki, the plaintiff’s low back pain has carried on to date, but it
does not impair her daily activities functionally in any way.  The plaintiff
was not taken to hospital, and  indeed she went for several years without any
medical attention in respect of her injuries.

[38]        
The plaintiff had been questioned at her examination for discovery on
June 25, 2010.  Those answers were part of a larger Notice to Admit served
on the plaintiff and they form part of the evidence tendered at this summary
trial.  The plaintiff indicated her low back troubled her and she also suffered
headaches, but she did not take medication for either.  She indicated that
sometimes she would have a day when she did not have back pain.  She did not
feel the injuries sustained in the accident had precluded her from joining
activities or from doing well in school.  Since the accident, she has been
involved in basketball, badminton, volleyball and skiing.  She has been on
school teams of badminton, basketball and floor hockey, and she dances with her
sister.

[39]        
With her family, the plaintiff has enjoyed numerous holidays since the
accident.  On one of those occasions, she went horseback riding, after which
she took a series of lessons over a period of two years.  She enjoyed
activities around her home such as rollerblading and, in the summertime,
swimming.  She was troubled by drowsiness, which occurred when she was having
difficulty following her teachers in school.  At the time of her examination
for discovery in June 2010, she had drowsiness difficulties for two or three
years.  She further described the problem as occurring one to two times a day.

[40]        
The plaintiff recalls being shown exercises, she believes by
Dr. Lukowska.  She had massage therapy following the accident, as well as
chiropractic treatment.

[41]        
Following the accident, she took modelling classes and was cast in one
commercial as a soccer player.

[42]        
In addition to the evidence tendered in the Notice to Admit, there was
also an affidavit by the plaintiff, sworn June 19, 2012, before the
Court.  She deposed:

After the accident, I started to get pain in my back, neck,
and both legs (including my right knee), as well as headaches.

Since the accident, the pain in
my left leg went away, but I’ve continued to have pain in my right knee and
right leg, back (mostly lower back), and neck.  There has been some improvement
in the pain in my neck, back, right knee and right leg.  I have not had any
improvement in my headaches and lately they seem to be coming more often.

[43]        
She deposed that, while she continued with activities, they caused her
pain and discomfort in her back, neck and right knee.

[44]        
Her mother indicated that the plaintiff had seemed to be in shock at the
scene of the accident.  She took the plaintiff to see their family doctor,
Dr. Lukowska, on the Monday following the accident.  The plaintiff was
complaining of a stomach ache, headache, neck pain, back pain and left leg
pain.  On the recommendation of Dr. Lukowska, Ms. Williams took the
plaintiff to massage therapy, as well as chiropractic treatments at Fraser
Chiropractic Massage Therapy.

[45]        
I accept Dr. Purtzki’s findings that the plaintiff’s injuries were
caused by the accident.  She states as follows:

Maya’s low back pain symptoms are most likely related to the
MVA.  The headaches are more likely due to sinus disease and unrelated to the
MVA.  There may have been MVA-related headaches, but on my examination in 2011,
there were no findings of neck-related soft tissue tenderness that would likely
trigger headaches.

Secondary distress and deconditioning related to chronic pain
are most likely due to the MVA.

The right knee pain noted in 2011
is likely not related to the MVA.

[46]        
I find the plaintiff’s difficulties were caused, on a balance of
probabilities, as a consequence of the accident.  It is clear, in the wording
of the report, that Dr. Purtzki was able to distinguish between injuries
that were sustained as a consequence of the accident and not in that she
described the knee problem as unrelated to the accident.  I find that the
wording “most likely”, and “quite likely”, mean, on a balance of probabilities,
and that the injuries are a consequence of the accident.

[47]        
Also before the Court was the report of Ana Flores, an occupational
therapist, who spoke in respect of the cost of treatment of the different
modalities of treatment including massage therapy, physiotherapy, chiropractic
treatment  and psychological counselling.  It is of note that Ms. Flores
wrote her report in relation to a patient that would undergo treatment in British
Columbia.  She did not provide information respecting costs in Florida, where the
plaintiff currently resides.  Ms. Flores noted that physiotherapy in
British Columbia is $100 per hour, and, for a rehabilitation and physiotherapy
assistant, it is $50 per hour.  Psychological counselling, she said, ranges
from $150 to $200 per session.  As well, she noted, the cost of a related pain
management program where an assessment is $2,500 and a five-week
multidisciplinary pain management program is $11,060, and that this modality of
therapy was recommended by Dr. Purtzki.  In her report she referred to the
Pain Clinic at British Columbia Children’s Hospital, should be considered as
advisable “if physical activities are not resulting in pain relief”.

8.              
PROGNOSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

[48]        
Dr. Barton, writing in 2010, noted that the plaintiff has to be
physically active:  “[s]he will need to be physically active and also
participate in school sports as much as possible to strengthen and stretch her
muscles.”  She indicated that this would result in the plaintiff experiencing improvement
of her symptoms of neck pain, headaches and low back pain.

[49]        
Dr. Purtzki, writing in June 2012, did not believe that the
plaintiff’s ongoing headaches were caused by the motor vehicle accident, but
rather instead were related to chronic sinus disease.  In May 2012, she wrote, “I
think that the plaintiff would benefit from a general activation program for
her lower back pain.”  She noted that the plaintiff was not participating in an
exercise program at the time that she wrote her report.  Dr. Purtzki also
recommended psychological counselling as a support to cope with pain and
progress with her activation, i.e. her return to exercise, as this “can be a
significant obstacle to overcoming pain-related deconditioning”.  She wrote:  “Referral
to the complex pain at BCCH (British Columbia Children’s Hospital) or a
psychologist specializing in pain management is advisable if physical
activities are not resulting in pain relief.”  She concluded that the plaintiff
was at increased risk of a flare-up of the low back and neck pain and chronic
myofascial pain with recurrent injury.  She noted that she had had the symptoms
for an extended period of time, and concluded that an uncomplicated resolution
of the symptoms was unlikely.

9.              
CREDIBILITY

[50]        
Counsel for the defendants concedes that credibility is not an issue in
this Rule 9‑7 summary trial.  It would not have been appropriate for
the Court to proceed to summary trial were there to be issues of credibility to
be determined,  as this summary trial is before the Court on the basis of the
affidavit evidence.  There was no request to cross-examine the plaintiff or her
mother on her affidavit, nor do I find it would be necessary to do so to determine
the issues before the Court.

[51]        
The defendants did submit that the plaintiff’s evidence could be viewed
as unreliable given that a number of years had passed since the accident.  The
defendants ask that the Court examine the evidence, being mindful of the fact
that a number of years had passed in which no medical activity had occurred.  The
defendants also asked the Court to note that there have been no records
forthcoming from Florida.  I do take that into account in my assessment of the
injuries of the plaintiff.  Nonetheless, I am also mindful of both the comments
of the Court of Appeal and Smith J. at trial that the absence of records
is not to be equated with no injury (see in Edmonson v Payer, 2011 BCSC
118 and 2012 BCCA 114).

10.          
CONCLUSION RESPECTING INJURIES

[52]        
I find that the injury before the Court is a mild, soft-tissue injury to
the plaintiff’s low back that had largely resolved by 2010.  The ongoing headaches
suffered by the plaintiff that occur infrequently are not related to the motor
vehicle accident.

[53]        
The plaintiff has, since the accident, become deconditioned and suffers
from “secondary distress” as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident.  It
would be helpful for the plaintiff to be involved in a regular general exercise
program.  I accept Dr. Purtzki’s finding that the plaintiff is at an
increased risk to experience flare-up of “lower back and neck pain and chronic
myofascial pain” with the current injury.

[54]        
In regard to the plaintiff’s pain, Dr. Purtzki wrote that “psychological
counselling and support to cope with pain in the progress of her activation”
would be useful, as Dr. Purtzki finds that can be a “significant obstacle”
to activation programs.

[55]        
In summary, I find that there was a soft-tissue injury to the plaintiff’s
lower back and neck.  The injury to her low back was acute for the first few
months following the accident and thereafter were at a mild level.  Her neck
injury is mild.  I find that the pain in her neck and back had largely resolved
by the time of the discovery in 2010.

[56]        
Dr. Barton, writing in 2010, felt the plaintiff would recover fully.

[57]        
By June 2011, the plaintiff was no longer complaining of neck pain.

[58]        
The plaintiff also suffers ongoing headaches but I find these are not
related to the accident.  I am mindful the plaintiff deposed on June 19,
2012 that she “continued to have pain in my right knee and right leg back
(mostly lower back), and neck.”  Her doctors, however, attribute neither her
headaches nor her leg problems to the accident.

11.          
Non-Pecuniary Damages

[59]        
The plaintiff seeks non-pecuniary damages in the amount of
$35,000-$40,000, relying on Claydon v. Insurance Corporation of B.C.,
2009 BCSC 1077; Dhanoa v. Hui, 2008 BCSC 907 [Dhanoa]; and Edmondson
v. Payer, 2011 BCSC 118, aff’d 2012 BCCA 114.

[60]        
The defendants submit that an appropriate award would be in the amount
of $5,000-$10,000, and rely upon Biggar v. Dadswell, 1998 CarswellBC 674;
78 A.C.W.S. (3d) 498, [1998] B.C.J. No. 718; Kadir v. Rodriguez,
April 10, 2001, British Columbia Provincial Court; Kellins v. Grotkopp,
2000 BCSC 1137; Lago v. Zimmerman, [1997] B.C.J. No. 3096; and Smith
(Guardian Ad litem) v. Vantunen, 2002 BCSC 1686.

[61]        
In connection with both positions, the Court finds the cases are
distinguishable.  The case of Dhanoa relied upon by the plaintiff, in
which the court assesses non-pecuniary damages at $25,000, was in the
context of injuries having a greater impact on the plaintiff.  I find this was
not in evidence here.  Additionally, in Dhanoa, the plaintiff suffered
from a pre-existing cerebral palsy.

[62]        
In Claydon, non-pecuniary damages were assessed at $35,000 in a
situation where the plaintiff was a pedestrian struck by a vehicle.  In Edmondson,
non-pecuniary damages were $40,000 and the plaintiff was to have ongoing
intermittent neck pain and occasional headaches, which was significant enough
to make her life less comfortable and less enjoyable.  I find that that is not
like the case before the Court.  The plaintiff has expressly stated that she
was able to continue in school and participate in physical education in school,
as well as sports outside of school.

[63]        
Of the cases cited by the defendants, in Biggar v. Dadswell, the
Court awarded $7,500 in a situation where the Court found, at
paragraph 17, that the plaintiff’s injuries had resolved within nine
months.  The other cases submitted by the defendants similarly do not assist
the Court in assessing damages, as they are chiefly involving plaintiffs who
had recovered in a short period after the accident.  The award in Kellins v.
Grotkopp arises in different circumstances as it was an adult police
officer who sustained injuries in the performance of his duties in relation to
those sustained by an intoxicated individual.  I find the cases distinguishable
on their facts from the case at bar.

[64]        
The analysis in the case of her sister, Brandy Naks, which was argued at
the same time, is appropriate.  I find instead in the cases of Khangura v.
Zhang, 2007 BCSC 1289 ($26,000 pain and stiffness in neck, shoulders and
lower back, and pain continuing to low back at date of trial); Hoang v.
Smith Industries Ltd., 2009 BCSC 275 ($19,000 soft tissue injury to neck
and, back and neck pain and headaches persisting three years after the
accident); and Lee v. Hawari, 2009 BCSC 1904 (soft tissue injuries
persisting two and a half years after the accident; $21,000 award in
non-pecuniary damages) to be closer to the case before the Court.

[65]        
In all circumstances I find $16,000 to be an appropriate award for
non-pecuniary damages.

12.          
Cost of future care

[66]        
Dr. Purtzki had recommended an activation program and psychological
counselling in support to cope with pain and facilitate the plaintiff’s
progress in once again getting physically active.  I am not satisfied that
there is a need for complicated assessments of the plaintiff, given the lack of
pursuit of any further medical testing, rehabilitation or follow-up in the
intervening years.

[67]        
The plaintiff has not met the onus to establish that she would use such programs
or services such as the Pain Clinic at B.C. Children’s Hospital.  In Izony
v. Weidlich, 2006 BCSC 1315, the Court held if a plaintiff has not used a
service in the past, it may not properly be the subject of an award.  There was
some evidence from Ana Flores as to the cost of massage therapy and
chiropractic treatments, as well as the cost of counselling.

[68]        
I accept that the plaintiff’s mother, when she was in Vancouver, was
unable to take her daughter to doctors because of time constraints.

[69]        
Since the plaintiff now lives in West Palm Beach, Florida, I find that
Ana Flores’s report is helpful only insofar as it gives a rough baseline of the
cost of certain modalities of treatment.  Ms. Flores does not speculate on
the cost of continued care for the plaintiff’s injuries in Florida, as opposed
to British Columbia.

[70]        
Compensation for the cost of future care must be because it is both medically
justified and reasonable:  see Milina v. Bartsch (1985), 49 BCLR (2d) 33
(SC).  It is an objective test based on the evidence, to restore the plaintiff
to her pre-accident condition.  In the plaintiff’s case, both her treating
physician and Dr. Purtzki noted she would benefit from an exercise program
and counselling to deal with her ongoing complaints of pain.

[71]        
As articulated by the Court of Appeal in Krangle (Guardian ad litem
of) v. Brisco, 2002 SCC 9, the assessment of the cost of future care is not
an exercise in mathematics, but instead should be arrived at by the Court as a
fair determination for resolution of the issues.

[72]        
In all of the circumstances, and mindful of the medical evidence that the
plaintiff should start an exercise program and obtain counselling, I award the
plaintiff $4,000 for the cost of additional treatments.

13.          
SPECIAL DAMAGES

[73]        
The plaintiff underwent certain treatment on the recommendation of her
doctor after the accident.  Outstanding, unpaid treatment costs are $472.34.

[74]        
I award special damages in that amount.

14.          
SUMMARY

[75]        
I award the plaintiff:

[76]        
If the parties are unable to agree on costs, counsel may, within 30 days
of the release of this judgment, speak to costs by advising the registry.

____________ “Maisonville J.”_____________
Maisonville J.